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I. INTRODUCTION
High-definition television ("HDTV")' is coming, but so far, it is
1. "[High definition television is a cutting edge consumer electronics technology which
offers markedly superior video display, and is estimated to become a $20 billion industry by the
mid-1990's." S. 952, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1989). HDTV would make use of
technologies such as flat screen displays, fiber optic multipliers, 4M-bit and 16M-bit DRAMS,
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not coming from the United States. With high-resolution picture
quality on large, extra-wide screens and sound quality equivalent to
the fidelity of a digital compact disk, HDTV will not only redefine
virtually every aspect of the television industry2 but will advance the
electronics industry as well. The market for this new technology has
been estimated to range from $20 to over $200 billion annually by the
year 2010.1 The race to capture this market is on in Japan, Europe,
and the United States. Japan, who fostered the development of
HDTV in the late 1960's, had spent an estimated $700 million on its
research and development by 1988. By that time, Europe had
invested over $220 million, while the United States-the country that
invented television-had invested virtually nothing.4
Recently, however, both United States public and private sectors
have realized the potential spoils involved in becoming a player in the
manufacturing and distribution of HDTV. The hope is that if the
United States can become competitive in the fruition of HDTV tech-
nology, the benefits will uplift America's sagging electronics indus-
try.5 Having been responsible for the development of products such
ASICs, advanced microprocessors, optical disks, and other highly advanced digital technology
to produce the wider, more highly defined picture. Robertson, A Winning HDTV Script,
Electronic News, Feb. 27, 1989, at 8, col. 1; see also Kenny, Get the Picture: A Guide to High-
Technology TV, STEREO Rv., April 1989, at 65.
2. Elmer-DeWitt, Who Wants to Wait for HDTV?, TIME, Feb. 5, 1990, at 50; see also
Sanger, Sony's Norio Ohga: Building Smaller, Buying Bigger, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 6
(Magazine), at 23, 24 (Sony's buyout of Columbia Pictures Entertainment was made "[w]ith
HDTV in mind."); Pollack, The Setbackfor Advanced TV: Mosbacher, in Shift, Wants Wider
Policy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1989, at Y1, col. 3.
3. See Pollack, supra note 2, at Y21, col. 6 (stating that "using the American Electronics
Association's own rosy projections for development of the technology, sales would only total
about $30 billion in 2010"); High Tech's Fickle Helping Hand, TIME, Dec. 4., 1989, at 68
(noting that "the U.S. stands to lose 2 million jobs and suffer a $225 billion increase in its
annual trade deficit by the year 2010 if it does not develop a coherent strategy to compete in
HDTV and associated industries").
4. R. LURIE, THE WORLD VCR INDUSTRY (Harvard Business School Report No. 9-387-
098, 1987, rev. ed. Jan. 23, 1990) (available from Publishing Division, Harvard Business
School).
5. An American Electronics Association report says that the U.S. must re-enter the
consumer electronics market by developing its own HDTV system or lose substantial world
market share in semiconductors, microcomputers, factory automation, and
telecommunications. Robertson, AEA Study Says US. Needs HDTV, Electronic News, Nov.
28, 1988, at 36, col. 1. HDTV's extensive use of semiconductors will bring about a revolution
in electronics, and a U.S. market share of less than 10% will lose U.S. semiconductor firms
50% of their market share through the year 2010. If the Japanese control the HDTV market,
they will be able to keep foreign competitors out of these semiconductor markets, which would
reduce U.S. competitiveness in other sectors, such as personal computers, as well. Idt Michael
Borrus, Deputy Director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, for
example, thinks that the focus should not be on HDTV but on "[h]igh volume high-
technology." Pollack, supra note 2, at Y1, col. 3. Proponents of the HDTV effort feel that it is
not meant to be a panacea but merely a beginning. Erich Bloch, former IBM vice president
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as the computer chip and the VCR, American industry is well aware
that invention and development of a new product is not tantamount
to capturing the financial rewards of its commercial success.6 With
this lesson in mind, America's success or failure in the burgeoning
HDTV industry must be viewed as paradigmatic of the country's abil-
ity to compete in the new globalized marketplace.7
In an effort to insure that the United States will play a role in
producing this technology, members of the 101st Congress became
increasingly focused on the potential of the joint venture format.
Countries competing with the United States encourage joint venture
activity for the efficiencies and economies which often ensue; yet, it is
believed that U.S. producers are overly wary of even discussing the
possibility of a joint venture for fear of an antitrust attack. At this
stage of HDTV development, joint ventures may indeed be one of the
few ways for American producers to participate. With this in mind,
the Congress proposed several bills which would specifically aid the
HDTV industry.9 While these "HDTV bills" vary on the questions of
government subsidies and tax credits, most propose some form of
antitrust amendment which would encourage United States producers
to enter into joint ventures so that they may compete more evenly
with producers from Europe and Japan. 10
In addition to the HDTV bills, Congress also proposed several
"generic" bills which are geared to encourage joint ventures in all
industries, including HDTV.1" As the current administration seems
vehemently opposed to an industrial policy of picking specific indus-
and now director of the National Science Foundation states that "the U.S. could restart its
consumer electronics industry with a concerted effort in HDTV." Bylinsky, Where Japan Will
Strike Next, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 50.
6. This can be demonstrated by the comments of the Speaker of the House, Thomas S.
Foley, who stated: "Today, the America that invented the computer chip and the VCR has
seen its market share shrink or vanish in both products. We are falling dramatically behind in
new technologies such as high definition television." T. Foley, Democratic Response to the
1990 Presidential State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 1990) (available at the University of
Miami Law Review office).
7. "The new high-definition television technology is a litmus test of how Washington will
act to increase the international competitiveness of U.S. industry." J. GATruso, HIGH-
DEFINITION TELEVISION: WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CAN Do 2 (Heritage
Foundation Issue Bulletin No. 150, 1989).
8. See infra notes 221-51 and accompanying text.
9. S. 952, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1516, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.
1267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
10. See infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text; see also Pollack, supra note 2, at Y1,
col. 3.
11. H.R. 2264, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1025, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 423,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see infra notes 187-220 and accompanying text.
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tries for special treatment,' 2 these generic bills may be the greatest
legislative hope for United States HDTV producers. The generic
bills, by not discriminating as to industry, would ease the application
of all antitrust laws to specific classifications of joint ventures. These
classifications either would be limited to production,' 3 or under some
of the proposals, would include distribution joint ventures as well.' 4
Both the "HDTV" and the "generic" proposals attempt to
encourage joint ventures by applying either a "certification" approach
similar to that of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
("ETCA"), 5 or by applying a "registration" approach like that of the
National Cboperative Research Act of 1984 ("NCRA").' 6  The
ETCA, through its certification approach, allows companies collabo-
rating in export to obtain an advanced certification which substan-
tially immunizes them from antitrust attack.' Alternatively, the
NCRA registration approach presently aids research joint ventures, 18
does not immunize them from antitrust attack, but allows them to
register with the government in a manner that: (1) shelters them from
the potential liability of triple damages inherent in American antitrust
law;' 9 and (2) insures that a less draconian standard of review would
be used in the event of antitrust litigation.2' The questions of which
approach (certification, registration, or none) should be enacted, and
which joint ventures (production, marketing, or HDTV only) should
be covered, are of concern here.
This Comment evaluates these current bills which intend to
invigorate the HDTV industry, and America's competitiveness in
general, by fine tuning antitrust laws to encourage joint ventures. Sec-
tion II defines the joint venture and differentiates between research,
production, and distribution joint ventures. Section III outlines
United States antitrust policy generally, with a discussion of the cur-
rent judicial and legislative standpoints, and includes a focus on the
ETCA and the NCRA. Section IV details the present "HDTV" and
"generic" Congressional proposals. Section V examines the regula-
tion of collaborative efforts in Japan and in the European Economic
12. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
15. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102, 96 Stat. 1233
(1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-03, 4011-21 (1988).
16. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 6, 98 Stat. 1818
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)).
17. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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Community. Section VI discusses the relative merits of each propo-
sal. Section VII concludes that an NCRA-type registration approach
(as opposed to an ETCA-type certification approach) for production
joint ventures (as opposed to distribution or HDTV-specific joint ven-
tures) would be prudent and afford some of the necessary incentive to
benefit American high-technology producers and allow them to com-
pete fairly in the ever-changing globalized marketplace.
II. JOINT VENTURES DEFINED
Historically, joint ventures have been valuable tools for indus-
try.2 1 In order to better understand the current legislative proposals
(especially vis-a-vis the antitrust laws), it is helpful to be familiar with
the different classifications of the joint venture format. Having been
characterized as "one of the darkest corners of antitrust, '2 2 the Amer-
ican joint venture is a hybrid which has no uniform legal definition.23
21. See generally J. TAUBMAN, THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAx CLASSIFICATION 27-54
(1957).
As Justice Clark observed:
It is said that joint ventures were utilized in ancient times, according to
Taubman, who traces them to Babylonian "commenda" and Roman "societas."
Their economic significance has grown tremendously in the last score of years,
having been spurred on by the need for speed and size in fashioning a war
machine during the early forties. Postwar use of joint subsidiaries and joint
projects led to the spawning of thousands of such ventures in an effort to perform
the commercial tasks confronting an expanding economy.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964) (citation omitted).
22. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws." A Summary
Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453, 453 (1979).
23. For tax purposes, Taubman simply defined joint ventures as: "[any] association of two
or more natural or judicial persons to carry on as co-owners [of] an enterprise, venture, or
operation for the duration of that particular transaction or a series of transactions." J.
TAUBMAN, THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSIFICATION 83 (1957). Another definition of
a joint venture is:
[a]n enterprise, corporation or partnership, formed by two or more companies,
individuals, or organizations, at least one of which is an operating entity which
wishes to broaden its activities, for the purpose of conducting a new, profit-
motivated business of permanent duration. In general, the ownership is shared
by the participants with more of less equal equity distribution and without
absolute dominance by one party.
G. YOUNG & S. BRADFORD, JOINT VENTURES: PLANNING AND AcTION 11 (1977). Other
definitions have varied substantially. See, e.g., N. LATrIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM,
CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (4th ed. 1968) (stating that the joint venture "is
nothing more than an ad hoc partnership"); Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technologi-
cal Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635, 670 (1979) (noting that "a joint venture can be seen
as a partial rather than complete integration of two firms, which preserves pro tanto their
capacity to compete with respect to the portion of their operations that is not integrated in the
joint venture"); Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1531, 1536 (1958) (defining joint venture as "a group which undertakes an economi-
cally productive activity in concert in order to overcome the impracticability of any one mem-
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Generally, a joint venture can be any association of two or more firms
for achieving any commercial objective. 24 However, Professor
Brodley has defined joint ventures more narrowly for antitrust
purposes:
"[A joint venture is an] integration of operations by two or more
firms where: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the
parent firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent
makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the
enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents; and
(4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise capability in
terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new product,
or entry into a new market.25
In other words, a valid joint venture must create some significant new
capability. It exists to benefit its parent firms, is fueled financially or
otherwise by its parent firms, and operates as a separate business
entity rather than as a union. 6
ber's amassing sufficient capital for the project or in order to eliminate the economic waste
involved in duplication of effort").
The definitional issue of joint ventures can also be viewed through an "exclusionary"
approach in which certain joint actions are not joint ventures, for example: (1) a "naked
restraint"--one where the joint conduct has no purpose apart from controlling output and/or
increasing price; (2) a merger; or (3) an agreement to buy and sell assets or products or services
with no additional relationship." PRACTICING L. INST., 29TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTI-
TRUST SEMINAR: MERGERS, MARKETS, AND JOINT VENTURES 305-07 (1989).
The Acting Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition once stated that "[flew terms in
antitrust law are used with as much uncertainty as 'joint venture law.'" Winslow, Joint Ven-
tures--Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 979, 979 (1985). Pitofsky
notes that "[u]ncertain enforcement can be traced in part to problems of definition." Pitofsky,
A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 Antitrust L.J. 893, 893 (1985); see
also Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956); Note, A
Definitional Test for Joint Ventures, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1985) (noting the need for
a clear definition of joint ventures "to enable courts to prevent companies engaged in anticom-
petitive conduct from circumventing antitrust laws by hiding behind a joint venture facade").
24. Pogue, Antitrust Considerations in Forming a Joint Venture, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
925 (1985). The firms may be competitors or they may be in different geographic or product
markets or at different levels on the distribution chain. See H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 111 (1985); Zwart, Innovate, Integrate, and Cooperate: Antitrust
Changes and Challenges in the United States and the European Economic Community, 1989
UTAH L. REV. 63, 72-73.
25. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (1982)
[hereinafter Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitruse Policy]. Brodley devised this definition by
focusing on the efficiency gains and anticompetitive risks which justify distinctive antitrust
treatment for joint ventures. Id. at 1525. This definition has found acceptance among
commentators. See, e.g., Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New
Antitrust Regime for Joint Research and Development Ventures, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 133, 144
(1986); Zwart, supra note 24, at 70 n.26. See generally Brodley, Joint Ventures and the Justice
Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 337 (1979);
Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws; A Summary
Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453 (1976).
26. The joint venture entity may operate under different legal forms. The parents may
There are various financial justifications for a company to coop-
erate in a joint venture.27 The benefits generally include achieving
economies of scale28 or transactional economies,29 lowering risk
through cost spreading, 30 accelerating result horizons,3" and easing
entry into new markets.32 Depending on the situation, a joint venture
enter into a partnership agreement or form a separate corporation of which they hold the
shares. Zwart, supra note 24, at 70. However, as a joint venture involves the creation of a new
business, it is more comprehensive than a mere contractual arrangement. Brodley, Joint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 25, at 1527. But see United States v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (joint venture where control was achieved
through contract terms rather than through ownership control).
27. One commentator listed the primary incentives for participating in a joint venture as:
"(1) risk avoidance, (2) technology acquisition, (3) utilization of the assets and attributes
belonging to partners, and (4) organizational superiority." Wright, supra note 25, at 145.
28. Hovenkamp states that:
"The most traditional justification for joint ventures is that they can enable
two or more firms working together to perform an activity at minimum optimal
scale (MOS), while a single firm acting alone could not. For example, suppose
that three firms use a particular, specialized metal alloy in the production of
certain parts. Efficient production of the alloy requires a plant capable of
producing 100,000 tons per year, but the three firms each require only 40,000
tons per year in their production process. If the three firms together build the
plant they will be able to maintain output at an efficient rate.
H. HovENLAMP, supra note 24, at 112 (footnote omitted).
29. Even where joint ventures are neutral or only marginally related to competitive
considerations, they may offer significant transaction advantages. For example,
the joint venture format, which essentially allows the contributors to participate
through sharing profits rather than various kinds of fixed fees, may be highly
desirable where the value of the contribution of each parent to the joint venture is
hard to measure.
Pitofsky, supra note 23, at 895; see also Kitch, The Antitrust Economics of Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 957, 964 (1985) (discussing joint venture transactional efficiencies vis-A-vis the
works of Coase and Williamson).
30. Wright, supra note 25, at 145. While the overall risk of a given project is the same
whether under the joint venture form or not, a share in several projects can reduce total
exposed risk. Id Risk sharing is a very common pro-joint venture consideration which
"doesn't really exist in any of the other alternatives." De Lone, The Joint Venture Versus
Other Alternatives, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 915, 917 (1985).
31. Joint ventures were extensively used during World War II "having been spurred on by
the need for speed and size in fashioning a war machine during the early forties. Postwar use of
joint subsidiaries and joint projects led to the spawning of thousands of such ventures in an
effort to perform the commercial tasks confronting an expanding economy." United States v.
Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1963) (emphasis added).
32. See JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 197 (W. Friedmann & G.
Kalmanoff eds. 1961) ("In a number of less developed countries, a foreigner is precluded by
law or policy from investing in certain industries except on a joint venture basis."). This may
also be done in a subtler manner than direct government regulation. Japanese producers, for
example, may reduce trade barriers for American corporations who join their cartels, thus
enabling the Japanese to "control the situation." 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 115
(1989) (quoting Joseph Alioto, Jr., antitrust practitioner); see R. KOMIYA, M. OKUNO & K.
SUZUMURA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF JAPAN 180 n.16 (1988) (MITI refused to allow Texas
Instruments a license to establish a subsidiary that would produce semiconductors unless it
agreed to, among other things, a 50-50 joint venture with a Japanese company.). See generally
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format may present significant advantages over the alternatives of
contractual arrangements, mergers, or internal' expansion. 33  How-
ever, joint ventures may also be inviting for their ability to cloak com-
petitors or potential competitors who are engaged in collusive
practices such as price fixing, output restriction, and monopoly-creat-
ing market division. This latter category of "advantages" gives rise to
legitimate antitrust concerns.
34
As the mere characterization of an enterprise "as a 'joint venture'
is to say nothing about its effect on competition or its legality under
the antitrust laws,"' 3- in examining joint ventures from an antitrust
perspective, more specific classification is helpful. A joint venture can
be classified by the central or final stage of the business cycle in which
it is intended to operate.36 Accordingly, there are research joint ven-
Blechman, Use of Joint Ventures to Foster US Competitiveness in International Markets, 53
ANTTmusT L.J. 65 (1984).
33. Other than the joint venture, the three basic options for firms attempting to expand in
either research and development, production, or marketing are: (1) acquisition or merger;
(2) contract, e.g., supply and distribution agreements; and (3) internal expansion. De Lone,
supra note 30, at 916; see Brodley, supra note 25, at 1528 ("[A] merger may neither make
economic sense nor be desired by the parties. In addition, mergers can themselves raise serious
antitrust problems."); De Lone, supra note 30, at 919 (Internal expansion, in some instances,
can be an unattractive alternative.); Pitofsky, supra note 23, at 895-96 (Contractual
arrangements may require anticipation of a prohibitive amount of contingencies and mergers
may be politically or commercially undesirable.); Wright, supra note 25, at 146 ("[The joint
venture] can be formed for a discrete project or series of projects, the participants need not
totally merge all their assets and operations, and each co-venturer retains more control over
the direction of the enterprise than would a mere investor."); see also Rule, The
Administration's Views on Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRusT L.J. 1121, 1125-28 (1985) (The
article discusses a joint venture which was the solution to competitive problems caused by
merger (citing United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,427
(W.D. Ky. 1985)).).
34. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 111; see also Pitofsky supra note 23, at 895 ("Some
joint ventures are little more than cloaks for cartel-like activities--allowing the parties to adopt
a non-aggression pact with respect to present and future competitive activities.").
35. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 11; see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) ("Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the
proposition that agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress
competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project a 'joint
venture.' Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain trade could be so labeled.").
36. However, there are other ways to classify joint ventures. Brodley has developed a
system which classifies joint ventures on the relation of the venture to the parents' business
operations: (1) horizontal joint ventures, (2) output joint ventures, (3) input joint ventures,
(4) related market joint ventures, and (5) interlocking joint ventures. Brodley, Joint Ventures
and Antitrust Policy, supra note 25, at 1552. Jorde and Teece classify "operating joint
ventures" as a separate enterprise that performs sets of activities on behalf of the parents. In
contrast, "non-operating joint ventures" are those in which the enterprise contracts with their
parents and other parties to perform the collaborative activity. Jorde & Teece, Innovation.
Cooperation, and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (1989); see also PRACTICING L. INST.,
27TH ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: MERGERS, MARKETS AND JOINT VENTURES 298-
99 (1987) (classifying joint ventures into three categories: (1) backward joint ventures formed
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tures, production joint ventures, and distribution joint ventures."
Firms in any of these joint ventures must not only forgo the ability to
remain independent but must deal with conflicts that may arise in
such areas as the divvying up percentages of input and reward38 and
the choosing of other venture partners.39 Yet, despite these inherent
problems with participating in joint ventures, there are also distinct
advantages within each classification.
Research joint ventures can speed up the development and inno-
vation of new technologies by pooling such assets as labor and knowl-
edge. 4° They take advantage of economies of scale by eliminating
duplication of costly research allowing otherwise wasted resources to
be invested in other areas. 1 Additionally, they help to minimize the
problem of firms "free riding" on the results of research which cannot
be effectively protected by patents or other means, thereby aiding
firms who might otherwise forgo the potential result.42 Recognizing
these benefits, and in an effort to increase United States competitive-
by competitors to supply a product or service useful to their industry; (2) forward joint
ventures formed for joint marketing of competing finished products; and (3) new market joint
ventures formed to exploit or create a new product or market). However, this does not
preclude other possible venture forms. See W. FRIEDMANN & J. BPGUIN, JOINT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING CouNTRIES 3 (1971) ("[T]he joint
capital venture [is] an enterprise in which two or more parties, representing one or several
developed and one or several developing countries, share the financial risks and the decision-
making though joint equity participation in a common enterprise.").
37. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRusT LAW 1 1477, at 348 (1986) (A "joint venture' usually
refers to a research, production, or marketing enterprise."). Vakerics divides joint ventures
into two broad categories: production and marketing joint ventures (P&MJVs), and research
and development joint ventures (R&DJVs). T. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 10.1, at 10-5
(1989).
38. See Zwart, supra note 24, at 72-73.
39. For example, problems occurred in IBM's relation with the Sematech joint venture
due to IBM's desire to join JESSI (a European joint venture). As IBM produces about 35% of
its chips in Europe, it did not want to close off this market. However, Sematech refuses to
admit foreign players for fear that the Japanese will also enter. Smith, Can Consortiums Defeat
Japan?, FORTUNE, June 5, 1989, at 245-54.
40. Wright states that:
Individual firms lacking all the ingredients necessary for a successful
research project (e.g. trained personnel, essential patents and licenses, or access
to raw materials) are likely to form research joint ventures with other firms
possessing different missing ingredients ...[that] may produce a synergistic
effect which lowers the total cost of R&D.
Wright, supra note 25, at 148.
41. Id ("When effective research requires extremely expensive facilities which small firms
cannot afford by themselves, a joint venture may result in an overall increase in R&D.").
42. "Research and development (R & D) and advertising are two areas in which free rider
problems are significant.... A research joint venture will benefit all the firms in the market,
however, and force all to share in the costs." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 114. Patents
and intellectual property law have only limited effectiveness in protecting technologies from
free rider activity. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 36, at 6.
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ness, Congress passed the NCRA which gives a level of antitrust cer-
tainty to firms specifically engaging in research (as opposed to
production or distribution) joint ventures.43
Production joint ventures have the ability to harvest the tremen-
dous economies of scale available in large-scale production' and may
also accelerate the production process.4 5  They have been used to
acquire more sophisticated manufacturing techniques and to gain
knowledge of foreign markets.46 Also, the production joint venture
scenario may facilitate capital formation in situations where institu-
tions are more amenable to lending on the credit of several firms
rather than one.47 Similarly, where investment cost is prohibitive to a
single firm, a production joint venture may permit that investment's
realization through cost sharing and risk spreading.48
Flexibility is one of the distribution joint venture's main advan-
tages; however, this flexibility may also lead to antitrust uncertainty.
Distribution joint ventures have been used to educate consumers,
49
consolidate inefficient selling practices,"° form purchasing coopera-
tives, 1 and market private label products.52 Export joint ventures are
distribution joint ventures formed to compete with disparate offshore
43. For a detailed discussion of the NCRA, see infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
44. "Reasons for expecting economies of scale in production are many. Specialization and
division of labour in production, the existence of indivisibilities, the economies of increased
physical dimensions of some plants, and economies of manual resources are often quoted." D.
HAY & D. MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS THEORY AND EVIDENCE 41 (1979).
45. See generally id at 41-47, 141-80.
46. See Weinbaum, Antitrust Problems in Conducting the Joint Venture's Business
Activities, 54 ANTrrmusT L.J. 993, 996 (1985) (The General Motors/Toyota production joint
venture was an opportunity for GM to learn "a great deal" from the Japanese about small car
production, while Toyota was able to see if it could adapt American suppliers and unions to
Japanese production methods.). Currently, in this era of global democratization, joint
ventures are being used to gain access to formerly communistic countries. See Ticket to
Europe: Joint Ventures, USA Today, March 13, 1990, at B6, col. 5 ("General Motors and
Volkswagen have just announced separate joint ventures in which each will build cars in East
Germany.").
47. Small high technology firms have particular problems with capital formation. Banks
generally base their willingness to lend money on the firm's physical assets but "a large
proportion of [small firms'] assets are contained in the technological potential or their new
products." R. OAKEY, R. ROTHWELL & S. COOPER, THE MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SMALL FIRMS 164 (1988).
48. Id at 129-30.
49. Trade associations are common examples of joint ventures formed by particular
industries to educate their customers.
50. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see
also infra notes 103-07 and accompaning text.
51. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing, 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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trade policies. 53 Agreements to form television networks,5 coordi-
nate and limit network coverage of sports leagues," and agreements
to collect and share data5 6 are also examples of distribution joint ven-
tures. With so many different possible applications, the distribution
joint venture deserves especially close antitrust scrutiny.
III. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE
A. Generally
There is an arsenal of statutory provisions which a plaintiff may
employ to attack joint ventures. The Sherman Act is the primary
deterrent of joint venture activity. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
hibits every business combination or conspiracy which unreasonably
restrains trade,57 and it can be construed to assert that "[c]oncerted
conduct is inherently suspicious."" Section 2, although generally
applied to the independent conduct of a single firm, would also apply
insofar as the joint venture involves actual or attempted monopoliza-
tion.5 9 Under the Clayton Act, if the joint venture is a corporation, it
may be reviewed using the merger provision of Section 7 which pro-
hibits corporate acquisitions that lessen competition. 6' Moreover,
53. Export joint ventures have been given favorable antitrust treatment for most of the
history of United States antitrust law enforcement. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying
text (discussion of Webb-Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982). See
generally Shenefield, Export Joint Ventures, 54 ANTrrRusT L.J. 1039 (1985).
54. See, eg., United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1342 (2d Cir. 1981).
55. See, eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); infra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id
58. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 92.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person, or persons to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
60. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1988)) provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person
1990] HDTV 1169
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1159
under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a joint venture may be
analyzed using Section 5 which prevents "unfair methods of
competition."'"
Antitrust laws may be enforced by the government or by private
plaintiffs. Two federal agencies share jurisdiction to bring govern-
ment suits: the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), an independent
administrative agency; and the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice ("DOJ"), under the direction of the Attorney General, and
indirectly, the President.62 Private actions for damages or injunctive
relief may be brought by a firm's competitors or by persons that might
sell to, or purchase from the venture. 63 Approximately ninety-five
percent of all antitrust actions are brought privately. 4 To encourage
these private suits, United States law automatically awards a success-
ful private plaintiff three times the actual damages.65 This provision
engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.
See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (preventing corporations from
accomplishing through a joint venture what would be prohibited as a merger). See generally
Comment, A New Standard for Evaluating Conglomerate Joint Ventures Under Clayton Act
Section 7 and a New Formula for the Potential-Competition Doctrine, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1441
(1982).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."); see
Yamaha Motor v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); FTC
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977). "Application of Section 5
seems particularly likely where the joint venture is not incorporated, rendering Clayton Act
§ 7 inapplicable." PRACnCING L. INST., supra note 36, at 301-02.
"In certain circumstances, however, [joint ventures] may also implicate other antitrust
laws, including... Section 3 of the Clayton Act and provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act."
Katsh, Collateral Restraints in Joint Ventures, 54 ANTrrRUST L.J. 1003, 1003 (1985).
Additionally, certain industry-specific adoptions of the antitrust laws may apply. See, e.g.
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1988).
62. See J. BURNS, ANTrrRUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 8-9 (1969). The agencies have an agreement to allocate investigations
efficiently and they "work out between themselves which agency has the greater expertise to
handle a particular investigation." Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and
Opportunities, ANTITRUST L.J. 979, 980 (1985). It should also be noted that the Justice
Department is able to actively enforce antitrust laws using criminal liability for corporate
executives. See generally Grippando, Caught in the Non-Act: Expanding Criminal Antitrust
Liability for Corporate Officials, 34 ANTrrgUST BULL. 713 (1989).
63. Pogue, supra note 24, at 925 n. 1. Additionally, a joint venture partner may bring suit
itself. See, eg., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
64. Hovenkamp & Schwartz, Treble Damages and Antitrust Deterrence: A Dialogue, 18
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 68 (1986).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988) provides in part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
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for treble damages has come under increasing criticism for discourag-
ing efficient behavior, overdeterring, and impairing American firms'
ability to compete internationally." In addition to treble damages,
the prevailing plaintiff will be awarded attorney fees, contrary to the
"American Rule" of each party paying for its own counsel.67
In deciding Sherman Act cases, courts may use one of two meth-
ods of scrutinizing a firm's activities.68 Under the rule of reason
method, a court will attempt a balancing of the procompetitive versus
the anticompetitive effect of the agreement.69 If the agreement is
found to be net anticompetitive, it is illegal under the rule of reason.
Conversely, under the per se method, a court will decide if the agree-
ment is of a type which will almost always produce an anticompetitive
effect. Agreements to boycott, fix prices, limit production, engage in
tie-ins, and share horizontal markets have been held as illegal per se. °
The ease of winning an antitrust suit is often dependant upon
which method of analysis a court decides to use. Under rule of reason
analysis,71 the plaintiff generally has a burden to establish the mar-
ket's size and structure, the costs involved, the existence of other par-
ties, and the disincentives for the other parties to engage in the same
activities which the venture creates.72 Under per se analysis, a plain-
tiff must only show that the anticompetitive practice took place and
the extent of the resultant damages. A court may hold that the per se
rule prevents it from considering relevant facts'3 -such as a defend-
ant's market power and efficiencies or reductions in cost which were
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
66. See Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61
TUL. L. REv. 777, 791 (1987).
67. See J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 301 (1988). See
generally B. KELLMAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (1985).
68. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1987)
(Antitrust cases are to be analyzed under either a rule of reason or a per se method.).
69. See, e.g., infra notes 71, 89 & 96 and accompanying text.
70. See R. GIVENS, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH app. C (1989).
71. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the court stated:
[T]he court must consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
Id. at 238.
72. Id
73. See. e.g., infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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passed along to the end consumer. 74 Thus, under rule of reason anal-
ysis the defendant is in a better position, while per se analysis favors
the plaintiff.
7"
The ease of winning per se cases-coupled with the windfall
potential of treble damages and attorney fees-has been blamed for
encouraging suits whose sole motive is to stifle competition or obtain
large settlements. United States industry has become wary of entering
into even innocuous agreements for fear of having to defend an anti-
trust action.76 Indeed, antitrust cases concerning joint ventures sup-
port this fear as they demonstrate the perennial lack of uniformity.
B. Case Law Applicable to Joint Ventures
Although it may appear that there is a facile division between a
per se and a rule of reason analysis, in practice, the Supreme Court's
case history has been ambiguous and unclear from its inception. By
tracking this history, one can see that the Court has taken vacillating,
if not contradictory, positions as to whether certain conduct is to be
analyzed under the per se or rule of reason standard. This has caused
uncertainty for potential joint venturers.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 77 was the first
antitrust case the Supreme Court ever decided on the merits, and
some have referred to it as a joint venture case.78 In Freight Associa-
tion, a consortium of eighteen railroad companies entered into a joint
running association which coordinated members' schedules, transfer
of cargo, and freight rates.79 In its decision, the Court queried:
"What is the meaning of the language as used in [Section 1 of the
Sherman Act], that 'every contract, combination in the form or trust
74. See Mt. Vernon Sundat, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,842 (E.D. Vir. 1976).
75. See Cavanagh, supra note 66, at 826-29.
76. Id at 809-10. Cavanagh discusses the fact that when faced with such actions,
companies often decide that settlements are the better alternative even if the claim is baseless.
Id Professor Folsom states that:
I'm opposed to eliminating the treble-damage element but I have to tell you that,
based on my experience here in the private sector, I'm convinced that there are
an enormous number of treble-damage cases that have no logical basis other than
the hope that-because litigation is so costly-the defendants will give the
plaintiffs some money.
Folsom, Mergers, Tacit Collusion, and Import Protection: The Case for Hard Competition (II),
17 ANTrrrusT L. & ECON. REv. 57, 75 (1986).
77. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
78. While this case seems to involve merely cartel price fixing, the association can be
viewed as a joint venture. See H. HOVENKAMP supra note 24, at 11; Kitch, supra note 29, at
957 n.2.
79. Freight Association, 166 U.S. at 292-97.
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or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce... is
hereby declared to be illegal'? Is it confined to a contract or combina-
tion which is only in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce
... ?'8o The Court decided that "[tlhe term is not of such limited
signification,"81 and refused to hold that only unreasonable restraints
of trade were in violation of the Sherman Act. 2
Thirteen years later, however, the Court in Standard Oil v.
United States8 3 gave a paradoxical explanation for Freight Association
by saying that:
It is undoubted that in [Freight Association] general language was
made use of, which, when separated from its context, would justify
the conclusion that it was decided that reason could not be
resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the acts com-
plained of were with in the statute .... [However,] [a]s the case[ ]
cannot by any possible conception be treated as authoritative with-
out the certitude that reason was resorted to for the purpose of
deciding [it], it follows as a matter of course that it must have been
held by the light of reason ....
If the criterion by which it is to be determined in all cases
whether every contract, combination, etc., is a restraint of trade
within the intendment of the law, is the direct or indirect effect of
the acts involved, then of course the rule of reason becomes the
guide, and the construction which we have given the statute,
instead of being refuted by [Freight Association], is by [that] case[]
demonstrated to be correct."
Thus, the first vague "rule of reason" standard was established in the
common law.
Seven years later in Board of Trade v. United States, 85 the Court
attempted to more clearly define this rule of reason. The issue was a
"call" price agreement between competing members of the Chicago
Board of Trade.8 6 Under the "call" rule, Board members were
allowed to trade commodities after regular trading hours, but only at
the price of the previous session's closing.8 7 Although the govern-
ment urged that this was illegal price fixing by competitors, the Court
80. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
81. Id at 328.
82. Id at 341-43.
83. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
84. Id at 64-66 (emphasis added).
85. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
86. The Chicago Board of Trade is one of the most perfect "real" world markets with
hundreds of buyers and sellers and nearly instantaneous price information. See H.
HovENKAMP, supra note 24, at 121.
87. Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 237.
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found the "bald proposition" of price fixing to be too "simple a
test."88 Holding that the call rule was a reasonable regulation of busi-
ness, Justice Brandeis stated:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. . . .The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. 9
For the first time, however, in the 1940 distribution joint venture
case of United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil,9° the Court limited this
application of the rule of reason in favor of assumptions that certain
types of agreements have a pernicious effect on competition and are
illegal per se.91 In Socony, an association of gasoline producers agreed
to allocate the gasoline supply. The depression-era agreement was
public and known to the government. Although there was no actual
price fixing, members of the association did make price "recommen-
dations." 92 Justice Douglas concluded that: "[u]nder the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of rais-
ing, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commod-
ity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."93
In the seminal 1964 joint venture decision, the Court in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical 4 again demonstrated the determinative
value of per se analysis versus rule of reason analysis. Penn-Olin
Chemical Company was a joint venture to produce sodium chlorate
for use in the paper industry by two parent companies who thought
that such production would be too risky to enter into without a part-
ner.95 Justice Clark's majority opinion affirmed the lower court's rule
88. Id. at 238.
89. Id
90. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
91. Id at 223-24.
92. Id at 179-83. Under the allocation agreement, each large producer was assigned to
independent producers who did not have strong marketing ability. The major producers,
therefore, were in a position to gear their own output and total output may have decreased in
the process. Id at 194-200.
93. Id at 223.
94. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
95. Id at 166-67.
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of reason analysis on the Sherman Act charge.9 4 This was despite the
strong dissent of Justices Douglas and Black who stated that:
"[a]greements among competitors to divide markets are per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act."
'97
The judicial pendulum swung back in 1971. The Court in United
States v. Topco Associates9' reverted to per se analysis in finding that a
distribution joint venture was in violation of the Sherman Act. In
Topco, an association was established to purchase and distribute pri-
vate label foods among twenty-five small grocery chains. Each mem-
ber was assigned a market, although the average member's share in
each market was only six percent. 99 This arrangement allowed these
smaller chains to compete more efficiently against larger chains who
could afford to produce and advertise their own labels.lc ° However,
the Court held that the agreement was to horizontally divide territory
and, therefore, illegal per se. Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]hether
or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule of rea-
son used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before us." 101
Chief Justice Burger stated that "[t]he per se rules ... [are] directed
to the protection of the public welfare; they are complementary to,
and in no way inconsistent with, the rule of reason."'
10 2
Yet, Topco does seem to be inconsistent with the Court's 1987
96. Id at 175-77. Regarding the Clayton Act Section 7 charge, the Court listed 15 criteria
to consider "in assessing the probability" a manufacturing joint venture would substantially
lessen competition:
[1] the number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; [2] the,
background of their growth; [3] the power of the joint venturers; [4] the
relationship of their lines of commerce; [5] the competition existing between
them [6] and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other;
[7] the setting in which the joint venture was created; [8] the reasons and
necessities for its existence; [9] the joint venture's line of commerce and [10] the
relationship thereof to that of its parents; [11] the adaptability of its line of
commerce to noncompetitive practices; [12] the potential power of the joint
venture in the relevant market; [13] an appraisal of what the competition in the
relevant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered into it
alone instead of through [the joint venture]; [14] the effect, in the event of this
occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential competition; and [15] such
other factors as might indicate potential risk to competition in the relevant
market.
Id at 177.
97. Id (Douglas, J., dissenting and joined by Black, J.) (footnotes omitted).
98. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
99. Id at 599-600.
100. Id
101. Id at 609.
102. Id at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Mt. Vernon Sundat, Inc. v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,842 (E.D. Vir. 1976) (Price fixing by a regional car
dealer association's advertising plan is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.).
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decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 1 3
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), a distribution joint venture of musi-
cal composers, publishers, and owners sold "blanket licenses" permit-
ting the licensee to use anything in the BMI library. The price of this
license varied according to the buyers' revenues, a type of price dis-
crimination that can only exist if the seller has monopoly power.104
Although the Court found that this was " 'price-fixing' in the literal
sense,"' 5 it refused to find that it was illegal per se:
[The] per se rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and
enforcement. And agreements among competitors to fix prices on
their individual goods or services are among those concerted activi-
ties that the Court has held to be within the per se category. But
easy labels do not always supply ready answers.
... [They] have joined together into an organization that sets
a price for the blanket license it sells. But this is not a question
simply of determining whether two or more potential competitors
have literally "fixed" a "price." . .. [When] two partners set the
price of their goods or services they are literally "price fixing" but
they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.... Thus, it is
necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within
or without that category of behavior to which we apply the label
"per se price fixing." That will often, but not always, be a simple
matter. "°
The Court justified the blanket licensing because "a bulk license of
some type is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to
achieve... efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license is that its price must be established."'' 0 7
A 1982 case, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,108
again blurred the picture for prospective joint adventurers. There, a
group of doctors agreed to set certain maximum fees for specific serv-
ices and insurance companies agreed to pay the full costs of those
services provided by a participating physician.I°9 However, the Court
implied that this was actually disguised minimum price fixing, there-
fore, illegal per se. l10 Justice Stevens attempted to justify this deter-
103. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
104. This could be viewed as an example of monopolistic price discrimination. See
generally R. GIVENS, supra note 70, §§ 10.1-.10.
105. 441 U.S. at 8.
106. Id at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
107. 441 U.S. at 17 n.27. The Court inquired whether the practice was "one designed to
'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.'" Id. at
20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
108. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
109. Id. at 339-41.
110. Id at 349.
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mination by citing judicial economy and experience:
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of rea-
son... have been reduced by the recognition of per se rule. Once
experience with a particular kind or restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it
has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is
unreasonable. " 1
This decision has been criticized for being too quick to make that
confident prediction because, in doing so, the Court failed to thor-
oughly analyze evidence which could have easily led to a different
outcome under the rule of reason.' 2 The Court's own opinion noted
that eighty-five to ninety-five percent of all physicians in Maricopa
County charged at or above the agreed-on rates and the insurance
companies had agreed to the lower prices.1 1 3 Additionally, doctors
were free to come and go from the plan as they wished. Thus,
"[t]hese facts are absolutely inconsistent with the economics of carte-
lization"' 14 and a rule of reason examination may have allowed the
agreement to protect consumers by reducing health care costs.
More recently, the Court examined a plan by the NCAA which
limited the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games
and the number of any games that any one college would be able to
televise in NCAA v. Board of Regents ." While the court of appeals
held that this television plan was illegal price fixing per se,116 the
Supreme Court used a rule of reason analysis to determine whether
the apparent purpose and the actual operation of the agreement was
intended to reduce competition, and whether it actually did so.'1 7 To
the surprise of those who thought that rule of reason analysis meant
automatic exoneration, the Court held that this joint venture imposed
restraints on price and output without achieving any positive or
procompetitive result and, as a result, violated Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.' 18
Currently, the rule of reason approach as applied in NCAA and
Broadcast Music would seem to be good law for the potential joint
venture to follow, however, as one commentator noted:
Per se treatment here may be contrary to current scholarly views
111. I at 343-44.
112. See H. HOVENKAMp, supra note 24, at 133.
113. 457 U.S. at 341 n.10.
114. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 133.
115. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
116. Id at 97-98.
117. Id at 103-04.
118. Id at 120.
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as to what the law should be, but one cannot always depend on the
courts to ignore cases that may seem outdated to the commenta-
tors, as we all know. It's a bit like the cross-eyed javelin thrower:
he shouldn't be dangerous, but he bears watching. 19
In fact, one can see this "cross-eyed javelin thrower" in cases like
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 20 where
an organization of dentists had a policy of withholding X-rays from
dental insurers evaluating patients' claims. 2 ' As the conduct resem-
bled a per se offense, the Court declared the conduct illegal under the
rule of reason-but without a substantial market analysis.' 22 The fact
is that businesses evaluating the history and the current state of anti-
trust law are presented with a fuzzy and confusing picture. Specific
legislation is necessary to encourage procompetitive joint ventures by
presenting a focused policy and a consistent antitrust law.
C. Antitrust Legislation Applicable to Joint Ventures
It has been estimated that between eleven and twenty-two per-
cent of the nation's gross national product is directly affected by some
antitrust exemption. 23 In fact, the first attempt to secure a legislative
antitrust exemption occurred even before the Sherman Act was
passed. 24 Many exemptions permit specific joint activity based on
the policy of assisting American business in competing with foreign
trade or more dominant industry. Exemptions have been granted to,
among others: agricultural cooperatives and fisheries, 25 ocean ship-
119. Halverson, McCarthy & Hibner, Discussion of a Joint Venture Hypothetical A, 54
ANTITRusT L.J. 1157, 1162 (1985) (panel discussion).
120. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
121. Id. at 460-61; 468 U.S. at 109-10.
122. 476 U.S. at 462-63.
123. See Pogue, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Committee on Antitrust
Exemptions, Antitrust Exemptions, Introduction, 33 ANTITRusT L.J. 1, 1 (1967). Exemptions
are made across a wide spectrum of industry and they are often carved-out to protect natural
monopolies or oligopolies such as professional sports associations, commodities and securities
boards of trade and exchanges, and patent and copyright holders. Some of these exemptions
are justified by the need to maintain favorable federal-state relations, while others allow the
federal government to engage in contracts for national defense needs. Exemptions also exist
for labor organizations, insurance companies, and the so-called learned professions. Id
124. In 1889 and 1890 attempts were made to exempt labor and agricultural organization
from the bills that led to the Sherman Act. Id. at 1 n.2.
125. When the Sherman Act became law, farm cooperatives and unions became subject to
prosecution under the Sherman Act, see, e.g., Georgia Fruit Exch. v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App.
123, 62 So. 542 (1913); Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 39 N.E. 651 (1895);
Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Coop. Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844 (1913), but by 1918
they had become strong enough to effectively lobby Washington for exemption. Congress
adopted Section 6 of the Clayton Act as national policy acknowledging the "need to allow
individuals to join together to attain competitive strength in an economic society dominated by
increasingly powerful business and industrial forces." Noakes, American Bar Association
1178
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Section of Antitrust Law Committee on Antitrust Exemptions, Antitrust Exemptions,
Agricultural Cooperatives, 33 ANTIMUST L.J. 7, 8 (1967). Section 6 of the Clayton Act
provides that:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)).
A more explicit policy was set out in 1922 by the Capper-Volstead Act, ch. 301, §§ 1-2,
42 Stat. 388 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988)). The Act stated that
"[p]ersons engaged in the production of agricultural products... may act together in associa-
tions . . .in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing." Id.
Farmers viewed Clapper-Volstead as their "Magna Carta" because the Act freed them by
allowing unrestrained expansion of their marketing activities. Pogue, supra note 123, at 8.
Fisheries were afforded similar protection in 1934 by the passage of the Fishermen's Collective
Marketing Act, ch. 742, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1213-14 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 521-522 (1988)), which is analogous to the Capper-Volstead Act.
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pers' associations, 2 6 and newspapers acting in concert. 27 However,
126. A protective exemption has existed since 1916 for ocean shippers in foreign commerce
which allows steamship lines to organize into pools and agree to offer preferential rates to
shippers who agree to use those lines exclusively. Although the Shipping Act, ch. 451, 39 Stat.
728 (1916) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1982)) (scattered portions repealed
in 1984), was actually silent on the issue of "double pricing," the practice was an accepted part
of the shipping industry until it was successfully challenged by the Justice Department in
Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). This practice was rejected by
the Court as per se unreasonable where "used as [a] predatory device[:." 1d at 499-500, see
also Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). A major effort was then joined
by many in government, including the White House, the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Federal Maritime Board, the shipping
conferences, and even the shippers, which effectively forced Congress to "clarify" the legal
status of these contracts and allow this dual rate structure subject to limitations. See Berghoff,
Ocean Shipping Conferences, 33 ANTITRusT L.J. 56, 60-61 (1987). The Shipping Act of 1916
was modified to state that:
[O]n application, the Federal Maritime Commission shall, after notice and
hearing, by order, permit the use by any common carrier or conference of such
carriers in foreign commerce of any contract... which is available to all shippers
and consignees on equal terms and conditions, which provides lower rates to a
shipper or consignee who agrees to give all or any fixed portion of his patronage
to such carrier or conference of carriers unless the Commission finds that the
contract ... will be detrimental to the commerce of the United States or contrary
to the public interest, or unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers,
exporters, importers, or ports ....
Shipping Act § 14b, 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1982) (repealed 1984). Although this portion of the
modification is now repealed, what remains arguably still permits such agreements:
The Commission shall by order ... disapprove, cancel or modify any (rate agree-
ment] that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory .... No such agreement shall be
approved, nor shall continued approval be permitted for any agreement
(1) between carriers not members of the same conference or conferences of carr-
ers serving different trades that would otherwise be naturally competitive, unless
in the case of agreements between carriers, each carrier, or in the case of agree-
ment between conferences, each conference, retains the right of independent
action, or (2) in respect to any conference agreement, which fails to provide rea-
sonable and equal terms and conditions for admission ....
Every agreement ... lawful under this section shall be excepted from the
provisions of the Act approved July 2, 1890 entitled "An Act to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and amendments and
Acts supplementary thereto ....
46 U.S.C. § 814 (1988) (located in appendix of Title 46).
127. In 1970, Congress promulgated the Newspaper Preservation Act in response to cases
finding antitrust violations where failing newspapers entered into joint operating agreements.
Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. 91-353, § 2, 84 Stat. 66 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1804 (1988)). The Act sets forth the following antitrust exemptions:
(a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for any person to
perform, enforce, renew, or amend any joint newspaper operating arrangement
entered into prior to July 24, 1970, if at the time at which such arrangement was
first entered into, regardless of ownership or affiliations, not more than one of the
newspaper publications involved in the performance of such arrangement was
likely to remain or become a financially sound publication: Provided, That the
terms of a renewal or amendment to a joint operating arrangement must be filed
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the current joint venture proposals are generally modeled upon
exemptions which have been set out by both the Export Trading
Company Act ("ETCA") (for companies collectively engaged in
exporting), and by the National Cooperative Research Act
("NCRA") (for companies involved in research joint ventures).
Therefore, understanding the mechanics of these acts is a vital spring-
board to comprehending the current proposals.
1. EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982 ("ETCA")
Although the ETCA was enacted in 1982, the Act and its certifi-
cation procedure-a model for the current legislation-was the result
of a lengthy evolution. American exporters have long claimed that
they have been unfairly disadvantaged by foreign competition which
was often in the form of combinations and cartels. Responding to
these concerns, Congress passed the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918128
which provided a system whereby the Sherman Act shall not "be con-
strued as declaring illegal an association entered into for the sole pur-
pose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such
export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the course of
export trade by such association."129 However, because the Webb-
Pomerene Act is limited to associations whose sole purpose is export-
ing, and because it contains no actual provision for advance certifica-
tion that would insure favorable treatment, 130 Congress eventually
passed the ETCA in 1982.131
with the Department of Justice and that the amendment does not add a
newspaper publication or newspaper publications to such arrangement.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into, perform, or enforce a
joint operating arrangement, not already in effect, except with the prior written
consent of the Attorney General of the United States....
(c) Nothing contained in the chapter shall be construed to exempt from
any antitrust law any predatory pricing, any predatory practice, or any other
conduct in the otherwise lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating
arrangement which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if engaged in by a
single entity.
15 U.S.C. § 1803 (sub-titles omitted); see Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969) (failing newspapers found guilty under the Sherman Act); Michigan Citizens for an
Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.) (failing newspapers allowed to
continue joint opperating arrangement under the Newspaper Preservation Act), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989).
128. Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, ch. 50, §§ 1-6, 40 Stat. 516, 516-17 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988)).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 62.
130. Ryan, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Antitrust Panacea, Placebo, or
Pitfall?, 28 ANTrrRUST BULL. 501, 503 n.5 (1983).
131. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102, 96 Stat. 1233
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4011-4021 (1988)).
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The ETCA "is intended to increase U.S. exports of goods and
services by authorizing banks to invest in export trading companies
[and] by exempting many joint export activities from U.S. antitrust
laws."' 32 While leaving Webb-Pomerine in place, the ETCA estab-
lished a certification procedure whereby any export association
(including those comprised of firms who engage in activities other
than exporting) may be immunized from all United States antitrust
laws. The Department of Commerce and the Justice Department will
certify an export association after jointly determining that its conduct
meets certain standards.1
33
Certification will completely preclude criminal or civil suits by
any government or private body on grounds covered by the certificate.
Although private parties may sue for damages if the standards are
violated, treble damages are eliminated. Furthermore, should the
plaintiff lose, the court may award the prevailing defendant its costs
and attorney fees.1 34 This certification system stands in contrast to
132. Bruce & Pierce, Understanding the Export Trading Company Act and Using (Or
Avoiding) Its Antitrust Exemptions, 38 Bus. LAW. 975, 975 (1983); see 15 U.S.C. § 4001.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 4013. The Act provides, in part:
A certificate of review shall be issued to any applicant that establishes that its
specified export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation will-
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of
trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export
trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors
engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported
by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the
sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods,
wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant.
Id. § 4013(a).
134. Id. § 4016. The Act reads in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no criminal or civil
action may be brought under the antitrust laws against a person to whom a
certificate of review is issued ... which is based on conduct which is specified in,
and complies with the terms of, a certificate issued under section 4013 of this title
which certificate was in effect when the conduct occurred.
(1) Any person who has been injured as a result of conduct engaged in
under a certificate of review may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, actual
damages, the loss of interest on actual damages, and the cost of suit (including a
reasonable attorney's fee) for the failure to comply with the standards of section
4013(a) ....
(4) In any action brought under paragraph (1), if the court finds that the
conduct does comply with the standards of section 4013(a), the court shall award
the more flexible registration system promulgated in 1984 to afford
antitrust protection to research joint ventures.
2. NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH ACT OF 1984 ("NCRA")
The NCRA1 31 is helping to encourage research and development
in the United States through a process which extends rule of reason
analysis to all research joint ventures and treble damage protection to
those who are properly registered. Many of the current proposals
would extend the Act's shelter to include production joint ventures
and some would include distribution joint ventures as well. While it
has been debated whether the NCRA is technically an exemption or a
clarification of antitrust laws and their enforcement,1 36 by providing
automatic rule of reason analysis and optional treble damage immu-
nity, its operation is such that it must be viewed, if not as an exemp-
tion, as a substantial fine tuning of antitrust law.
137
Prior to the NCRA, research joint ventures had traditionally
been treated favorably under United States antitrust law, 138 although
uncertainty and the substantial down-side of potential liability were
still great threats.1 39 The government attempted to address the fear of
joint research cooperation with the Antitrust Guide Concerning
Research Joint Ventures of 1980.14 Although the guidelines sought to
to the person against whom the claim is brought the cost of suit attributable to
defending against the claim (including a reasonable attorney's fee).
Id
135. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-462, § 6, 98 Stat. i815
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3131, 3139 ("[A] pre-eminent purpose of [the NCRA] is to clarify the antitrust
analysis of joint R & D ventures."), quoted in Wright, supra note 25, at 140 n.36.
137. "These claims must have been referring to the statutory enunciation of the rule of
reason test for evaluating joint R&D ventures, because detrebling was not a clarification of
prior law." Wright, supra note 25, at 140 n.36.
138. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department had a procedure whereby companies
considering entering into a xesearch joint venture could submit their plans for review. The
government would reply with a letter of opinion which stated the government's inclination to
bring suit under the given facts. See Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.6 (1983). The opinion letter could also describe what steps the venture should take to
comply. This procedure was viewed as insufficient largely due to the non-binding nature of the
letter and the probability that treble-damage actions could still be brought by competitors who
felt left behind by a major breakthrough of the joint research. See generally Crane, Joint
Research and Development Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 405 (1984).
139. See generally INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH INST., COMMERCE TECHNICAL ADVISORY BD.,
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TO COOPERATIVE ENERGY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (1975) (reprinted by Nat'l Technical Info. Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce)
(government study illustrating that corporate fear of antitrust was inhibiting joint research
cooperation.).
140. ANTrRuST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE
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clarify antitrust laws through examples, they were criticized as ambig-
uous and too conservative;1 41 thus, the guidelines were not an effective
tool to calm fear and stimulate joint research ventures.
In 1984, after considering a total of ten bills, the legislature unan-
imously passed the NCRA to stimulate "innovative research and
development by the private sector" and "enable American business
and industry to keep pace with foreign competitors in a world increas-
ingly dependent on technological innovation."'' 42 The NCRA only
benefits narrowly defined research joint ventures.143  It should be
CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980), reprinted as ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 992 (1980).
141. See Crane, supra note 138, at 426-32.
142. Statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division), 49
Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,122 (1984).
143. Section 2 states that:
The term "joint research and development venture" means any group of
activities, including attempting to make, making, or performing a contract, by
two or more persons for the purpose of-
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of
phenomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or
technical nature into practical application for experimental and
demonstration purposes, including the experimental production and
testing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or
(E) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A), (B),
(C), and (D). ... and may include the establishment and operation of
facilities for the conducting of research, the conducting of such venture on
a protected and proprietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for
patents and the granting of licenses for the results of such venture, but
does not include any activity specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The term "joint research and development venture" excludes the following
activities involving two or more persons:
(1) exchanging information among competitors relating to costs, sales,
profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of any product, process, or service
that is not reasonably required to conduct the research and development that is
the purpose of such venture,
(2) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct restricting,
requiring, or otherwise involving the production or marketing by any person who
is a party to such venture of any product, process, or service, other than the
production or marketing of proprietary information developed through such
venture, such as patents and trade secrets, and
(3) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct-
(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing, or sharing of inventions or
developments not developed through such venture, or
(B) to restrict or require participation by such party in other research
and development activities, that is not reasonably required to prevent
misappropriation of proprietary information contributed by any person
who is a party to such venture or of the results of such venture.
15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1988).
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noted that this "National" act is in no way limited to domestic busi-
ness associations; foreign corporations can and have taken tremen-
dous advantage of it. In fact, European and Japanese companies were
among the first to do so.'" Discriminating against foreign concerns,
however, would be a troublesome protectionist endeavour---especially
as determining the "nationality" of a firm has become increasingly
perplexing in this globalized marketplace.
45
The Act mandates that courts apply a specifically defined rule of
reason analysis when faced with antitrust challenges to any research
joint venture.'" Additionally, it requires that the rule of reason anal-
ysis be applied not only to alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act but to all "antitrust laws,"' 147 including state laws.148
Joint ventures whose existence and purpose are disclosed by
registration or "notification" 149 are entitled to the NCRA's
"detrebling" provision.150 By mandating registration, the NCRA dic-
tates a more stringent standard for detrebling than for application of
the rule of reason analysis. At this point, therefore, the joint venture
must decide if the safe harbor from treble damages is worth making a
public disclosure of business aspirations.
Regarding attorney fees: the NCRA awards them to a prevailing
144. See Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 3425 (1985). Toshiba, Furukawa, Isuzu, Matsushita, Fujtsu,
NEC, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone, Mercedes Benz, Saab-
Scania AB, Volvo, and BP Oil are only some of the foreign concerns who have entered into
research joint ventures under the NCRA to date. See, e.g., Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 1882 (1990);
Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 49367 (1989); Notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 5059 (1988).
145. See Reich, Who Is US.?, HARV. Bus. REv. 53 (Jan.-Feb. 1990).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 4302. This section reads:
In any action under the antitrust laws, or under any State law similar to the
antitrust laws, the conduct of any person in making or performing a contract to
carry out a joint research and development venture shall not be deemed illegal
per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into
account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, but not limited to,
effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research and development
markets.
Id.
147. See id. § 4301(a)(1).
148. Id § 4302.
149. Id. § 4305. Under Section 6, a detailed notification must be directed in writing to the
Attorney General and the FTC not more than 90 days after execution of a written agreement
to form the venture. Notice is also required to be published "in general terms" in the Federal
Register. The protection vests on publication, making treble damages unavailable. However,
the Section 4 shield addresses the scope of notification filed with the Attorney General and the
FTC, not the Federal Register.
150. Id. § 4303 ("[A]ny person who is entitled to recovery on a claim under such section
shall recover the actual damages sustained by such person ... if such claim... results from
conduct that is within the scope of a notification that has been filed under section [6].").
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plaintiffr" but provides that the court may award attorney fees to the
"prevailing party defending against any such claim... if the claim, or
the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivo-
lous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith." ' 2 Either
award can be offset if the court finds unreasonable conduct during the
litigation, 3 As defendants in joint venture actions-by definition-
represent several business associations, attorney fee awards may be
substantial.
The NCRA has been successful at encouraging research joint
ventures. 5 4  Under the NCRA, there are ongoing cooperative
research efforts in such areas as tamper-evident closures for baby
food,' 55 cement,' 56 deepwater mooring lines, 15 7 semiconductors,' s5
and HDTV.' 9 Research joint ventures to emerge from the NCRA
include: SEMATECH16° Bellcore,' 6' Microelectronics and Com-
puter Technology Corporation (MCC),'62 Computer Aided Manufac-
turing,' 63 the Zirconium Alloy Tubing Corrosion Research and
Development Program, ' " and the Petroleum Environmental
Research Forum.'
65
151. Id. § 4304.
152. Id. § 4304(a)(2). Note that FED. R. Civ. P. 11 grants judges a comparable power.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)(2).
154. Charles Rule has stated:
[W]hen we did the joint R&D legislation, you really couldn't find any joint R&D
cases, there really weren't any, and everybody assumed this was ridiculous,
nobody would ever use the damn thing, that it was just a waste of time. Well, the
fact of the matter is, the number of filings we have received under the NCRA has
vastly exceeded any of our predictions, and people really are using it, and people
really do get comfort from it in terms of forming their R&D ventures.
Denger, Halverson, Reasoner & Taylor, 60 Minutes with Charles F Rule, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 396 (1989) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with
Rule].
155. See Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 4917 (1990).
156. See Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 23479 (1986).
157. See Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 1740 (1990).
158. See Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 49123 (1989).
159. See Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 46660 (1989); Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 42577 (1989); Notice, 53
Fed. Reg. 20380 (1988).
160. See Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 49123 (1989).
161. See Notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 11352 (1988).
162. See Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 2633 (1985). MCC is a joint venture formed of about 20
companies in response to Japanese "targeting." See generally Zwart, supra note 24. Members
include: Boeing, Digital Equipment, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing (3M), Motorola, National Semiconductor, RCA, Rockwell, and Sperry. Id.
The consortium has several programs including one aimed at breakthroughs in advanced
computer architectures and artificial intelligence. MCC almost failed shortly after its creation
when it was threatened with antitrust action by a nonparticipating competitor. Id.
163. See Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 3425 (1985).
164. See Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 13769 (1987).
165. See Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 9554 (1987).
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IV. THE CURRENT PROPOSALS
A. Generally
There has been government interest in revising the status of joint
ventures since the Reagan administration's superconductivity initia-
tive in 1988.166 The current wave of antitrust concern, however, may
have been sparked by a pair of articles on the Wall Street Journal
editorial page by Attorney General William Thornburgh and Com-
merce Secretary C. William Verity: both articles urging Congress to
amend antitrust laws to spur production joint ventures.1 67 At a time
when the United States was beginning to realize that a role in high-
technology innovations, especially in HDTV, is vital to the industrial
166. H.R. Doc. No. 100-169, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). In February 1988, President
Reagan transmitted a message to Congress which included a draft of proposed legislation to
encourage innovation, productivity, trade, and technological leadership of the United States in
the area of superconductivity. While the bill included measures to increase protection for U.S.
patent holders, it also made the first proposal to amend the NCRA to extend into the area of
production joint ventures. The proposal's language with regard to the NCRA is substantially
the same as H.R. 2264 (The Cooperative Productivity and Competitiveness Act of 1989, infra
notes 195-97). As with H.R. 2264, this proposal would extended the NCRA's protection in a
generic fashion, i.e., not merely for superconductivity firms. See generally id. In the message,
President Reagan stated:
I should stress that the purpose of the NCRA is not to provide firms with
immunity for anti-competitive behavior. Our antitrust statutes will continue to
protect American consumers and businesses from harmful practices where they
occur. This extension of the NCRA should promote innovation and productivity
and will permit this country to maintain--or in some instances to regain-its
position of world technological leadership.
Id at 2.
167. United States Attorney Thornburgh stated that:
[E]ven with a rational and sympathetic government policy, the fear of a private
antitrust suit seeking treble damages, as well as attorneys' fees, is surely enough
to inhibit many worthwhile ventures. The U.S. economy can ill afford the
burden of such fear. Congress should consider amending the antitrust laws to
eliminate antitrust uncertainty with respect to joint production ventures.
Hufoauer, Wean the Steel Barons from Protection, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1988, at AI0, col. 3.
Secretary of Commerce Verity concurred:
Joint production ventures frequently would be the most efficient way to
bring new products to market, but any attempt by U.S. companies to conduct
joint production, even if approved by the government, virtually invites an anti-
trust lawsuit, which can result in a settlement requiring the innovating firm to
share valuable proprietary information with the challenger. This produces a chil-
ling effect on some kinds of technology development. At the same time, foreign
firms uninhibited by such laws take on similar joint ventures and threaten further
to erode U.S. leadership in technology and innovation.
Id at col. 5; see also Thornburgh, Verity Push Antitrust Law Revision; Goal Is to Allow US.
Firms to Better Compete Against Foreign Rivals, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1988, at Dl, col. 4;
Address by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to the Economic Club of New York on February
22, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1404, at 312 (Feb. 23, 1989).
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health of the country, 16 the 101st Congress took the call for reform
seriously and, in its first session, proposed seven bills which would
modify antitrust laws to encourage varying forms of joint venture. 169
The bills are divided between proposals specifically for HDTV and
proposals that are generic for all industry. Each operates through
either an extension of the NCRA's "registration" approach or
through an ETCA-type "certification" approach.
B. The High Definition Television Bills
The HDTV antitrust bills came as part of a Congressional move-
ment to aid the HDTV industry. 170  However, despite early support
by Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher17 1 and others, 172 the
thrust in Washington has shifted away from any specific HDTV pro-
gram. This shift has occurred for at least three reasons: (1) the Bush
administration does not want to be accused of an ersatz industrial
policy, i.e., picking industrial winners and losers; 173 (2) HDTV has
168. See Battle for the Future; Unless the U.S Can Match Japan's All-Out Effort, the Race
to Dominate 21st Century Technology May be Over Before it Has Begun, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989,
at 42 (demonstrating the Japanese head-start in HDTV and suggesting that "a little Japanese-
style teamwork ... could do wonders in the U.S.").
169. See infra notes 177-220 and accompanying text.
170. Other proposals, however, also have antitrust ramifications. The High Definition
Television Research and Development Act, for example, is one bill which has no effect on
antitrust legislation. It does, however, create consortiums of HDTV producers presumably to
function under the pre-existing NCRA. H.R. 1516, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The bill
would grant government funding of $100 million per year for five years through a program
whereby the Secretary of Commerce through the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology selects one or more HDTV joint research and development
ventures from respondents to a notice in the Federal Register. Id. at 6. The participants of
each venture selected would then negotiate with the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology the activities and responsibilities for which each would be
responsible. The Secretary and the participants would then submit a memorandum to the
"appropriate committees of Congress" delineating those responsibilities. Id. at 5. Each
venture would also have to submit annual reports to the Secretary, the Congressional
committee, and the U.S. Comptroller General. The bill also amends the Intellectual Property
Act to provide that all intellectual properties, trade secrets, and technical data resulting from
these joint ventures would be treated as if they are inventions made with Federal assistance
under chapter 19 of title 35 U.S.C. Id. at 6 (providing for remuneration when the ventures
become profitable); see also Congress Awash in HDTV Bills, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, May 22,
1989, at 72.
171. " 'In some of these high-tech areas, most probably led by high-definition television, we
need to make some changes so that there can be consortiums formed. And not only for
research and development, but also for manufacturing.'" Kilborn, Antitrust Easing Will be
Proposed to Aid TVEffort, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1989, Al, col. 6, D7, col. 1 (quoting Commerce
Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher).
172. See Should Uncle Sam Tilt to HDTV?, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at A18, col. I
(editorial stating that HDTV antitrust waiver is a good place to try to reverse the retreat of
American electronics companies).
173. See Boskin Notes Administration Opposition to Selective Relaxation ofAntitrust Law, 56
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become closely associated with those who seek huge government sub-
sidies to develop the technology-a difficult political argument for
leaders plagued by deficit budgets; 174 and (3) there are many other
technologies which may be viewed as equally important. 175 Although
the prospects for passage of a specific HDTV bill appear dubious,
these bills are noteworthy demonstrations of the current United States
manufacturing plight, and the potential remedial actions available to
Government through the NCRA and the ETCA. Importantly, they
also illustrate that HDTV is indeed becoming the paradigm of Ameri-
can competitiveness-a test of the country's ability to survive under
rival pressure.
176
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1416, at 747 (May 18, 1989). It is the Bush
administration's view that any review of antitrust policy will be on the basis of economic needs,
not in the context of government oversight of the market. Michael Boskin, Chairman of the
President's Council of Economic Advisers, stated: "'The administration will not engage in
industrial policy, period .... We will not pick winners and losers.'" Id (quoting Boskin); see
also J. GATruso, supra note 7, at 2 ("The 'industrialized policy' approach, by which
Washington picks out a favored industry to subsidize, is neither fiscally nor economically
sensible. Instead of providing special benefits to the private sector, Washington simply should
get out of the way, removing federal impediments to the development of new products and
services.").
174. See Ask US. for $1.35B on HDTV Project, Electronic News, May 15, 1989, at 1, col. 1
(A group of U.S. electronics companies asked the government for more than $1.35 billion in
subsidies as part of a plan to develop HDTV.); see also Yang, Fiscal Follies; Ever-Growing
Deficits Establish the Failure of Gramm-Rudman, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (Yang
demonstrates the ongoing difficulty in complying with the law designed to cut the budget
deficit to zero.). But the government has given some funding to HDTV through the Defense
Department. See, e.g., OK $20M Fundingfor HDTV in FY90, Electronic News, Nov. 6, 1989,
at 4, col. 3 (Senate-House approved $20 million for the Pentagon's HDTV program.).
Connelly, DARPA Picks Five Firms for HDTV Contracts, Electronic News, Jun. 19, 1989, at 6,
col. 1; Robertson, DOD Board Considers National HDTV Program, Electronic News, Apr. 17,
1989, at 4, col 3; see also Elmer-DeWitt, High Tech's Fickle Helping Hand: The White House
Wavers on Funding for Microchips and HDTV, TIME, Dec. 4, 1989, at 68 ("Opposition to U.S.
research cutbacks proved too much even for Budget Director Darman... [who told] reporters
that the press accounts of proposed research cuts were 'totally wrong. Not just 60% wrong,
but 100% wrong.' ").
175. "'What we've learned in the last six months is that there are a lot of other technologies
that are equally important.'" Pollack, The Setback for Advanced TV, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,
1989, at Yl, col. 3 (quoting Wayne Berman, counselor to Commerce Secretary Robert A.
Mosbacher). Additionally, "the federal government hardly is in the best position to predict
which technologies will or will not succeed in the marketplace." J. GATTuso, supra note 7, at
10. But see Robertson, Panel Urges HDTV Initiative, Electronic News, Sept. 11, 1989, at 1,
col. 3 (The National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors recommends to the Bush
administration the launching of a government/industry HDTV initiative which would serve as
a critical semiconductor technology driver, since the HDTV equipment will use significant
numbers of DRAMs, and create spill-over uses from the auto industry to computers and the
military.).
176. See supra note 7 and accompaning text.
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1. H.R. 1267: THE HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1989
Introduced by Representatives Don Ritter and Mel Levine, The
High Definition Television Competitiveness Act seeks "[t]o stimulate
the design, development, and manufacture of high definition television
technology."'' 77 In making its proposal, the bill states that "develop-
ment of HDTV technology by American industries is critically impor-
tant to the Nation's economy and security . . . [yet] the Nation's
electronic manufacturing industries have virtually ceased to develop
and manufacture consumer electronics in the last decade, due to
strong competition in both domestic and world markets and United
States trade policies."'7M The Ritter-Levine bill makes a strong
attack. It provides for over $500 million in funding for HDTV devel-
opment. 79 The NCRA would be amended to allow antitrust protec-
tion to extend to HDTV joint production, but not distribution,
ventures. 80 Tax breaks for research and development would be rein-
stituted,' and a market would be guaranteed for U.S.-produced
HDTV equipment by government purchasing."8 2
177. H.R. 1267, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
178. Id at 2.
179. Id. at 12. Title III grants federal support of $100 million for each of the years 1990
through 1995 through two programs. The first program would provide "general financial
assistance to cooperative HDTV enterprises to promote the discovery, development, and
commercialization of HDTV technology." Id. at 8. The second program would be established
to provide financial assistance for "pilot manufacturing projects and experimental community
demonstrations related to HDTV technology." Id The Secretary of Commerce shall only
allocate the funding to applicants who have entered into a joint cooperative agreement under
terms and conditions required by the Secretary. Each venture must provide at least half of the
cost of the project. Title VI of the bill appropriates another $500,000 to the Federal
Communication Commission's efforts to promulgate an HDTV broadcast standard. Id at 12.
180. The bill would amend Section 2 of the NCRA (15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1984)) by providing
treble damages and per se protection to registered joint ventures which would include those
"agreements concerning HDTV technology" and those ventures which would conduct
research on, or design, develop, or manufacture HDTV technology. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis
added). Title II also amends Section 313, the antitrust section, of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. § 313 (1972)) to exempt activities conducted for joint research, development,
and production if notification is in effect under the NCRA. Id at 6.
181. Title 1 of the Ritter bill repeals Sections 4(g) and 280(c) of the internal Revenue Code
of 1986 which relate to the termination and disallowance of exemption for research expenses.
Id at 5. Thus, in the name of HDTV, the bill repeals the elimination of tax credits for all
industrial research and development.
182. Title IV of the Ritter bill guarantees domestic HDTV manufacturers substantial
market potential by having the Commerce Secretary submit a plan to Congress to establish a
mechanism to coordinate procurement of HDTV technology by the General Services
Administration, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and other federal agencies. Id at 11.
HDTV
2. S. 952: THE HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1989
Senator John Kerry introduced S. 952 "to stimulate the design,
development, and manufacture of high definition television technol-
ogy, and for other purposes."1 '3 The Kerry bill "finds" that "cooper-
ative efforts and joint ventures by domestic companies must be
encouraged to foster domestic HDTV technology .... ".' Without
the funding of the Ritter-Levine bill, Kerry's bill also would amend
antitrust laws to allow the NCRA to include joint HDTV production
ventures,"'5 and the Kerry bill provides for a report to Congress and
the President on the status of HDTV.
1 86
C. The "Generic" Antitrust Bills
Unlike the floundering HDTV movement, the "generic"
approach still has a strong chance for implementation. Not only has
at least one independent foundation recommended that HDTV be
183. S. 952, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989). The Kerry bill reports proposed findings of
Congress on HDTV. Title I states:
The Congress finds that-
(1) the efficient deployment of HDTV and HDTV technologies will
require significant cooperative efforts by domestic companies;
(2) current statutory restrictions make it impossible for many companies
now involved in research, design and development of HDTV technologies
to cooperate or engage in joint ventures designed to facilitate domestic
HDTV development and manufacture; and
(3) cooperative efforts and joint ventures by domestic companies must be
encouraged to foster domestic HDTV technology research, design,
development and manufacture.
Id. at 3-4; see also Kerry Bill Would Extend 1984 Legislation to HDTV Production and Market-
ing Venture, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1415, at 707 (May 11, 1989) ("Kerry
declared that 'it is becoming very clear that, if we fail to act, we will have no HDTV produc-
tion capability at all in the U.S.' ").
184. S. 952, at 5.
185. Id. at 4. Section 102 of the Kerry bill lays the ground-work by amending Section 313
of the Communications Act of 1934 to exclude from the antitrust provision any activities
conducted as a cooperative HDTV enterprise in a joint research, development or production
venture under this bill. Id. at 4-5. Then, Section 103 of the bill amends NCRA Section 2(C)-
the section defining the safe harbor ventures-by including, "with respect to a cooperative
HDTV enterprise-(A) discussions, considerations, review, actions or agreements concerning
HDTV technology; (B) conducting research on, or design, development, or manufacture of,
HDTV technology; or (C) any combination of the activities described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B)." Id at 5 (emphasis added).
186. Under the Kerry bill the Secretary of Commerce would submit a report to the
President and Congress on the implications for international trade of HDTV technology
within 90 days after the passage of the bill. This report is to include the Secretary's
recommendations on appropriate "methods by which Federal laws governing international
trade may promote the development and viability of domestic manufacturers of HDTV
technology." Id. at 6.
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encouraged through generic antitrust reform,"8 7 but many in industry
and academia urge antitrust reform as well.18 8 Even President Bush,
after straddling the fence,'8 9 has come out in favor of reform."tg
Thus, the generic joint venture proposals are currently the main issue
in antitrust. 191
1. H.R. 1025: THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND
PRODUCTION AMENDMENTS OF 1989
Congressman Edwards introduced the National Cooperative
Research and Production Amendments 92 which would change the
name of the NCRA to the "National Cooperative Research and Pro-
duction Act of 1989." The proposal would amend the definitional
section of the NCRA to include the "production, marketing or distri-
bution of any product, process, or service."'' 93 The bill would also
187. See generally J. GATruso, supra note 7, at 10-12.
188. See Heads of High Tech Firms Urge Reform & Encourage Production Joint Ventures,
57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1435, at 461 (Oct. 5, 1989) (noting that Jack
Kuehler, President of IBM, for example, urges reform to encourage production joint ventures);
see also Jorde & Teece, supra note 36 (University of California at Berkeley professors urging
substantial antitrust reform to encourage cooperative arrangements).
189. In September 1989, James Rill, President Bush's Assistant Attorney General in charge
of Antitrust, stated that: "'Joint ventures will be encouraged or not encouraged because they
make economic sense. I'm not altogether sure that anyone is suggesting an exemption from
the antitrust laws.'" Be Happy Bush's Antitrust Chief Will Be Just That, FORBES, Sept. 4,
1989, at 20. In November 1989, Rill "praised" production joint ventures as a " 'very effective
way for U.S. firms to improve their competitiveness in world markets'" and he acknowledged
that the various proposals "may enhance business certainty" and encourage ventures needed
by the nation to maintain competitiveness." Rill Finds Proposals on Joint Ventures May
Enhance Business Certainty, Aid US., 57 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1440, at 659
(Nov. 11, 1989). In February 1990, Rill stated that existing antitrust laws have" 'not inhibited
our international competitiveness.'" Ostrow, Justice Department to Boost Antitrust Agency;
Trade: The Division Will Add Attorneys and Cases, It is Fighting Eforts by the Commerce
Department to Relax Joint Venture Laws, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at A2, col. 1. The article
also notes that reports that President Bush would ask Congress in his State of the Union
address to relax antitrust bars to production joint ventures were erroneous. Id.; see also
Murray & Barrett, Bush Aides Urge Antitrust Restrictions Be Eased for US. Firms' Joint
Ventures, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1990, at A2, col. 2.
190. See Antitrust Protection for Production Joint Ventures Urged by President, 94 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH), No. 94, at 1 (March 13, 1990).
191. Special Report, Joint Venture Exemptions Emerge as Prime Antitrust Issue in 1990,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 13, at S-18 (Jan. 19, 1990).
"'I think what we would like to do' a Republican Senate committee aide told BNA, 'is to
try to build a consensus' and then have a bill considered by the full committee. Legislation is
needed .... However, the effort to enact a joint production venture bill is thought to be at
least a three-year process, with 1990 representing the second year, the aide speculated." Id;
see also Special Report, Regulatory Outlook '90, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No.
13, at 3 (Jan. 19, 1990) ("Bucking the re-regulation trend are plans... to ease antitrust laws
with respect to production joint ventures.").
192. H.R. 1025, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
193. Id. Section 2 of the bill reads as follows:
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amend the NCRA to provide that coverage does not extend to any
production or distribution outside the scope of the venture. 94 This
bill is noteworthy in that it would extend coverage not only to joint
production agreements-as its title implies-but to distribution activ-
ities as well.
2. H.R. 2264: THE COOPERATIVE PRODUCTIVITY AND
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1989
The Cooperative Productivity and Competitiveness Act, 1 95 intro-
duced by Congressman Fish, would also amend the definitional scope
of the NCRA. However, by striking the term "joint research and
development venture" each place it appears and inserting "joint
research, development, or production venture," this proposal would
not extend coverage to joint distribution ventures.1 96 In fact, the
NCRA would be specifically amended to include "the production or
manufacture of any product or process in a jointly owned or operated
facility," but exclude "distribution[ ] or sale" joint ventures, in addi-
tion to "marketing" joint ventures (which are presently excluded
under the NCRA)
1 97
3. S. 1006: THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH
EXTENSION OF 1989
Introduced by Senator Leahy, S. 1006198 is the Senate version of
the Fish bill. Also proposed "to encourage innovation and productiv-
ity, stimulate trade, and promote the competitiveness and technologi-
cal leadership of the United States," the National Cooperative
Research Extension would amend the NCRA by making it applicable
to joint research and development or manufacturing ventures. 199 The
only difference between this and Representative Fish's bill is that,
Section 2(a)(6) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C.
4301(a)(6)) is amended-
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking "research and
development,"
... and
(4) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
"(E) the production, marketing, or distribution of any product, process,
or service; or"
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 2-3.
195. H.R. 2264, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
196. Id at 2-3.
197. Id
198. S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
199. IM at 1-3.
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here, production joint ventures are treated as distinctly separate from
research joint ventures.2'o Thus, a research joint venture which had
successfully developed a product would presumably have to register
separately to become protected as a joint manufacturing venture.21
4. H.R. 423: THE JOINT MANUFACTURING OPPORTUNITIES
ACT OF 1989
Representative Wyden introduced H.R. 423 "[t]o modify the
application of the antitrust laws to increase competition in trade by
encouraging small businesses to jointly manufacture and distribute
products. '20 2 Without modifying the NCRA, this bill would provide
protection similar to the NCRA but only for small production and
distribution ventures. The bill would allow small businesses203 to
combine into "flexible manufacturing networks 2 ' which, upon
200. Compare id. (which distinctly creates research or manufacturing ventures) with H.R.
2264, at 3 (implying that a research joint venture may "involv[e] the production of any
product or process").
201. Id
202. H.R. 423, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
203. "Small business" is defined as a "person" (see the definition of "person" under § l(a),
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15g(a)) that is primarily engaged in manufacturing; has fewer than
500 employees throughout the period which it participates under this bill; and controls not
more than 20% of any relevant market for the product manufactured and distributed through
such venture. Id. at 2.
204. The actual ventures covered by this act are highly defined and termed "flexible
manufacturing networks." Flexible manufacturing networks are defined as:
[A]ny group of activities, including attempting to make, making, or performing a
contract, carried out by 2 or more persons for any of the following purposes:
(A) Purchasing raw materials, services, or facilities to jointly manufacture
and distribute a product.
(B) Collecting and sharing information on production costs and
manufacturing capacity necessary to prepare a bid to sell a product jointly
manufactured by such persons.
(C) Collecting and sharing information applicable to the marketing of
such product.
(D) Sharing information on manufacturing and distribution capacity for
purpose of jointly manufacturing and distributing such product.
(E) Any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A), (B),
(C), and (D), and including the establishment and operation of facilities for
quality testing and other purposes related to jointly manufacturing a product.
(b) EXCLUSIONS.-The term "flexible manufacturing network" excludes the
following activities:
(1) Exchanging of information among competitors relating to costs, sales,
profitability, pricing, marketing, or distribution that is not reasonably required to
carry out a flexible manufacturing network.
(2) Entering into any agreement, or engaging in any conduct, to restrict a
person who participates in a flexible manufacturing network with respect to the




proper notification,205 would receive treble damage immunity," 6 rule
of reason scrutiny,2 7 and possible attorney fees for a prevailing
defendant in the event of antitrust litigation.208
5. H.R. 1024: THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE INNOVATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION ACT OF 1989
Representatives Richard Boucher and Tom Campbell °9 intro-
duced H.R. 1024 "[t]o encourage national cooperative research and
commercialization.1 210  This bill would provide the most extensive
205. Id at 7-8. Section 6 outlines the filing of the disclosure and notice procedure. A
flexible manufacturing network is to file a written notification with the Attorney General and
the Federal Trade Commission. The notification must disclose the identities of the parties and
the nature and objectives of the network. Id at 8. Additional disclosures are to be made in
case of a change of parties and are encouraged whenever "appropriate" to maintain and extend
the protection of Sections 3 and 4. Id The Attorney General or the FTC shall publish in the
Federal Register a general description of the network's planned activity within 30 days after
receiving the original notification, and at that time the benefits of Sections 3 and 4 shall vest.
Id With the exception of that publication, all information and documentary material
submitted and all other information obtained in the course of any investigation, administrative
proceeding, or case, with respect to a potential violation of the antitrust laws by the network,
shall be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) unless
protected through a protective order. Id. at 9-10.
206. Id at 4. Section 4 permits only actual damages to a prevailing private plaintiff in lieu
of the treble relief specified in the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15). Id. Similarly, a state
prevailing in a suit against a flexible manufacturing network would only recover total damage
sustained. Id.
207. Id. Section 3 provides that in any action under the federal or state antitrust laws, one's
conduct "in making or performing a contract to carry out a flexible manufacturing network
shall not be deemed illegal per se." Id. Instead, the conduct shall be judged "on the basis of its
reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition, including its
effects on competition in relevant markets." Id.
208. Id at 7. Section 5 provides that reasonable attorney fees and the cost of the suit
should be awarded to a substantially prevailing defendant if the claim, or the claimant's
conduct during the litigation, was "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad
faith." Id This award, however, may be offset if the court finds that the prevailing party's
conduct was also "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith." Id. Compare
id with FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
209. See Barrett, Rep. Campbell's Free-Market Resume Belies His Stance on Antitrust
Matters, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1989, at B10, col. 1 (Former FTC chief of antitrust enforcement,
Campbell, argues that U.S. computer-chip makers were so shocked by Japanese chip dumping
that they now need assurances that they can join forces to regain market share.).
210. H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989). Section 2 states Congressional findings and
the purpose of the bill. In addition to mentioning the benefits of cooperative arrangements and
technical innovation to the United States, the bill notes that "cooperative innovation efforts
present little or no threat to competition when cooperating firms lack substantial market
power, or when cooperative activity takes place in industries experiencing rapid technological
change." Id Thus, the bill's purpose is to:
[P]romote innovation and profitable product commercialization, facilitate trade,
and strengthen the competitiveness of United States based firms in world markets
by clarifying the legal standards applicable to cooperative innovation
arrangements and by establishing a procedure by which firms may seek approval
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protection to joint ventures of any of the pending bills.21 1 Rather than
modifying the NCRA, the Boucher-Campbel bill would create a pro-
cess by which companies seeking to enter a joint venture, or "coopera-
tive innovation agreement, 21 2 would obtain certification from the
DOJ or the FTC in much the same manner as companies are certified
under the ETCA.21 3 However, certification would be based on an
involved government review procedure similar to that currently used
for mergers under the DOJ's Merger Guidelines21 4 with special atten-
for their cooperative innovation arrangements from an authorizing agency, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, and thereby obtain exemption
from criminal antitrust actions or civil antitrust damage actions.
Id at 2-3.
211. This bill approaches the proposal set forth by Professors Jorde and Teece in their
article Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust: Striking the Right Balance. Jorde & Teece,
supra note 36, at 84-112. Jorde and Teece, however, go further by advocating: (1) a detailed
description of the rule of reason analysis; (2) symmetrical attorney fee shifting; and (3) an
amendment to the NCRA, in addition to the certification procedure, which would allow
business the choice of registration or certification procedures and immunities. Id at 71 n. 199.
212. H.R. 1024, at 2-3. "Cooperative innovation arrangement" is this bill's catch phrase
which covers a plethora of activities. See id. at 3-5.
213. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
214. Section 5 of the bill describes the process by which a "cooperative innovation
arrangement" may become certified. First, the parties to such an arrangement must file
disclosures with the Secretary of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Attorney
General which include, in addition to the identities of the parties and the nature of the
agreement: a description of the procompetitive benefits and efficiencies to be achieved; the
current market shares, in all relevant markets, of all parties; the predicted market share of the
arrangement including the basis for that prediction and an estimate of the effect on
competitors; the estimated market share index in all relevant markets, or if unattainable, the
number of firms in each market that are capable, alone or cooperatively, of engaging in the
type of innovation proposed. H.R. 1024, at 6-7.
Within 30 days of filing the application, the authorizing agency shall publish a notice in
the Federal Register that describes the parties and the arrangement, presumably in general
terms. Idr at 7. Within 30 days after that publication, the Secretary of Commerce shall have
reviewed the application and made formal recommendations to the authorizing agency. Id
The agency is to approve an application if, after consulting with the Secretary, it determines:
"(A) that the arrangement will not possess substantial market power in any relevant market;
and (B) that the duration of the arrangement will not exceed limits reasonably required to
accomplish the objective of the arrangement, and in any event will not exceed seventeen
years." Id. at 8.
Under H.R. 1024, an arrangement shall not have substantial market power in a relevant
market if the market share index of that market is, or threatens to become greater than 1800
and the arrangement does not increase or threaten to increase, the market share index by more
than 50, or if the market shares of the firms cannot be measured there must be at least five
firms who are capable, alone or cooperatively, of engaging in the type of activity proposed by
the arrangement. Id at 9.
The authorizing agency and the Secretary shall determine, based on a number of factors,
whether an applicant shall be certified. Id. at 10-13. They must examine the degree of market
power of the arrangement and whether it will harm competition and consumers by reducing
output or increasing prices. The procompetitive benefits and the existence of a logical
relationship between the contractual provisions of the arrangement and the achievement of
those benefits are to be examined with particular attention to indicia such as: whether the
1196
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tion paid to the parent firms' Herfindal Hirhchman Index ("HHI").2 "5
Once certified, a joint venture would enjoy complete immunization
from treble and actual damage claims as well as from criminal prose-
cution laws.216 Thos, standing to sue would be removed for anything
but injunctive relief, and that would be analyzed on a rule of reason
standard.21 7 Additionally, in any such litigation the losing party
would be required to pay attorney fees. 218 Furthermore, the Boucher-
Campbell bill includes virtually any joint venture-including those
for distribution.21 9 If no distribution is involved, however, approval
innovation sought will be better protected from free-riders under the arrangement; whether the
innovation sought is such that it will benefit from economies of scale; and whether the market
is characterized by rapid technological change. Id Additionally, it must be determined
whether the procompetitive benefits could be achieved by a single firm or a combination of
firms with less market power or by the parties to the arrangement in any substantially less
restrictive manner. Id Finally, the Secretary and the authorizing agency must determine
whether the existence of potential competitors in the relevant markets "precludes the potential
anticompetitive effects that might otherwise be inferred from such market power." Id at 12.
The authorizing agency may then grant, deny, or grant with modifications the
arrangement. If granted the authorizing agency shall publish a statement of approval in the
Federal Register, id at 13, and the approval shall take effect 30 days thereafter unless
modifications require a statement of the acceptance, id at 14.
215. The HRI equals the sum of the squares of each firm's market share and is the most
widely accepted indicium of industry concentration. See generally A. SwAN & J. MuRPHY,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BusINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIoNS ch. 7
(forthcoming) (available at the University of Miami Law School Library). Of course, in a pure
monopoly, the HHI would be 10,000; in a two-firm oligopoly with each controlling 50%, the
HHI would be 5000; with four firms each controlling 25%, the HHI would be 2500. However,
in a market where two firms controlled 25% each and 25 firms controlled 2% each, the market
share index would be 1350 and acceptable under this bill. See supra note 214.
216. The effect of approval is that:
[N]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be recovered in
any criminal or civil action based in whole or in part on conduct within the scope
of a cooperative innovation arrangement approved by the authorizing agency...
if such approval was in effect at the time of the conduct. The remedy of
injunctive relief available under section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 26)
shall be available in such criminal or civil action.
H.R. 1024, at 14-15. Approval may be revoked by the agency effective 30 days after publica-
tion of notice, or upon final judgment in the case of injunctive relief. Id at 15-16. Otherwise
the approval would remain in effect for 17 years, or a specified lesser term at the conclusion of
which the parties may submit for renewal. Id at 16.
217. Section 4 states that "no cooperative innovation arrangement" approved under this bill
"shall be deemed illegal per se" under state or federal antitrust laws. Id at 6.
218. Id at 20 ("Notwithstanding... the Clayton Act... the court shall, at the conclusion
of the action, award to the substantially prevailing party the cost of litigation of such claim
including a reasonable attorney's fee."). This provision could create a substantial disincentive
to potential plaintiffs as an unsuccessful suit against a joint venture would, of course, entail the
cost of at least two defendants' attorneys.
219. Id at 4. In addition to research, experimental production, and the development of
"management techniques," the bill allows possible exemptions in "manufacturing, producing,
marketing, distributing, or otherwise commercializing products, processes, or information
developed jointly." Id
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would be automatically granted if the economic benefits were found to
outweigh potential anticompetitive harm, no matter what the parents'
HHI.220
V. A WORD ON THE COMPETITION
A. Japan
Japan has a long tradition of concerted industrial activity. 221
The Japanese Antimonopoly Law of 1947222 was based on United
States law and adopted by the Japanese government during the post-
war, MacArthur occupation period.223 In a culture noted for its
220. Id. at 8-9.
221. According to Hadley:
If oligopolistic markets are to be called cartels, and if combines are to be called
cartels, then Japan does indeed have a long tradition of them. But if the term is
restricted to overt, explicit agreement among businesses independent of one
another, then the tradition is essentially of the 20 years preceding the end of the
Pacific War.
E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 373 (1970).
222. SHITEKI DOKUSEN NO KINSHI OYOBI KOSEI TORIHIKI NO KAKUHO NI KANSURO
HORITSU (Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act), translated as amended in Z.
KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN app. 7A (1987) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law].
The Antimonopoly Law's aim is stated in Chapter 1:
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, undue restraint of trade
and unfair business practices; by preventing the excessive concentration of
economic power and by eliminating undue restraint of production, sales, prices,
technology, etc., and all other undue restriction of business activities through
combinations, agreements, etc., aims to promote free and fair competition, to
stimulate the initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage the business activities of
enterprises, to heighten the level of employment and real income of individuals,
and thereby to promote the democratic and healthy development of the national
economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in general.
Id. app. 7A-1.
223. See E. HADLEY, supra note 221, at 120-21.
The Antimonopoly Act originally consisted of 10 Parts, 100 Sections and 14
supplementary provisions. It contained both substantive provisions and
provisions for an enforcement agency and its procedures. . . . It contained,
however, a number of provisions more severe than the then existing United States
laws. These more stringent provisions were principally in the: (a) prior approval
system for mergers, transfers of business and international contracts; (b) various
per se illegal provisions; and (c) dissolution of undue disparity in economic
powers.
The substantive provisions carrying out the aim of the Act were:
(a) Prohibition of private monopolization ... ; (b) Prohibition of unreasonable
restraint of trade... ; (c) Prohibition of unfair methods of competition ....
H. IYORI & A. UEsuGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 11 (1983).
The Antimonopoly Law currently provides:
1. No business association shall engage in any of the following practices:
1. substantially restricting competition in any particular field of trade;
1198
emphasis on cooperation, 22 the antimonopoly law was not rel-
ished,225 yet it was also not something the country could "avoid or
evade.1 226 Thus, the Ministry of Trade and Industry ("MITI") has
"spent the succeeding 30 years struggling to get around" American-
style antitrust.227
MITI has been successful. In 1953, the Japanese government
began relaxing the antimonopoly laws. 228 The per se illegality of car-
tels was eliminated. Depression cartels for declining industries and
MITI sponsored industry-specific cartels were allowed. And a system
of general cooperation under government auspices was promol-
gated.229 Under current Japanese law there is no reporting require-
ment for collaborative activities230 and no provision for treble
damages.231 Moreover, a private party may only bring an antitrust
action after the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") has made
a final and conclusive finding of violation.232 The resulting concerted
behavior, administered by MITI, and permitted by the JFTC, has cer-
2. entering into an international agreement or an international contract as pro-
vided for in Article 6, paragraph 1;
3. limiting the present or future number of entrepreneurs in any particular field
of business;
4. unduly restricting the functions or activities of the member entrepreneurs
(member entrepreneurs shall mean entrepreneurs Who are members of the busi-
ness association; hereinafter the same); or
5. causing entrepreneurs to do such acts as constitute unfair business practices.
Antimonopoly Law ch. I1, art. 8, § 1(1-5); H. IYoRI & A. UESUGI, supra.
224. "This overall pattern within Japan ... could never have developed in the United
States, for one reason: much of it would have been illegal under the American antitrust laws."
AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN 79 (T. McCraw ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
225. "'Businessmen with a long tradition of cartels and trade associations can understand
regulations arrived at after discussion among the competitors, much more readily than they
can the bizarre notion that concerted actions constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.'"
E. HADLEY, supra note 221, at 372 (quoting Mrs. Ariga and Professor Reike) (citation
omitted).
226. C. JoHiNSoN, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 175 (1982).
227. IL
228. For a comprehensive discussion of Japan's relaxation of its antimonopoly laws, see H.
IYORI & A. UESUGI, supra note 223, at 13-20.
229. Crane, supra note 138, at 439-41. When MITI seeks to promote cooperative activities
it will consult with the Fair Trade Commission and, once cleared, it is "extraordinarily
unlikely that the FTC would pursue antitrust remedies at a future time." Jorde & Teece, supra
note 36, at 56.
230. Jorde & Teece, supra note 36, at 57.
231. Crain, supra note 138, at 441.
232. Id Only four private actions, as of 1978, had been brought under the Antimonopoly
Law of Japan and no damages had been recovered in court. Id This is surely not only due to
the difficulty of bringing such a suit, but also due to the Japanese view of an American-style
litigation as "inefficient, obnoxious, and even irrational" as it sometimes prevents business
from ever getting done. AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN, supra note 224, at 27.
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tainly been a factor in the "Japanese miracle." '23 3 Aside from true
joint ventures, there are at least two other levels of Japanese, inter-
firm cooperative relationships. One is the keiretsu, which is a group
of affiliated companies such as Mitsubishi, for example, which encom-
passes more than 150 diversified companies in relationships intended
to be long-term and nurturing.234 A second level is the "family" net-
works led by such "core" firms as Toyota and Matsushita who con-
tract production work to closely related and substantially cross-
owned subcontracting firms.235 While some Americans have belittled
the holistic Japanese system as merely one of "picking winners, 236
there is no argument that it has been successful for Japan, as evinced
by, among many other things, a market share in computer chips that
has risen from zero percent in 1970 to seventy percent in 1989.237
B. Europe ("EEC")
Europe, in its emerging unification as the European Economic
Community ("EEC"), has an active antitrust policy. Yet, the EEC
insures a favorable climate for joint ventures. The basises for EEC
antitrust protection are the Treaty of Rome Article 85,231 analogous
233. AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN, supra note 224, at 27.
234. Id at 79-80. Of the six major Keiretsu, three originated as zaibatsu; the family-
controlled cartels which once "comprised the heart of the Japanese industrial economy" were
dissolved after World War II. Id
235. Id at 80-82.
236. See LTV FORUM, BASIC INDUSTRIES IN TROUBLE: WHY .. . AND ARE THERE
SOLUTIONS? 101 (1983) (address by Stanley Lundine, United States House of Representatives).
237. Van Tyle, U.9 Memories.: A Market in Fhux, ELECTRONICS, Sept. 1989, at 50.
238. Article 85 reads in full:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources or supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of the contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.




to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Article 86,239 analogous to Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. These Articles preempt or supersede
member states' antitrust laws.24 Exemption may be individually
received after application under Article 85(3)241 or may be covered by
certain block exemptions which the Commission of European Com-
munities ("Commission") promulgates.242 Criminal liability and pri-
vate treble damages are not included in the EEC scheme.243
Although the Commission announced in 1968 that pure research
joint ventures do not fall under Article 85(l),24 a 1983 report by the
Advisory Committee on Industrial Research and Development con-
cluded that Article 85 was still acting as a deterrent to cooperative
research, notwithstanding the exemption feature of 85(3).245 In
response, the Commission passed both "Commission Regulation
(EEC) No. 418/85 of the Treaty to categories of research and devel-
opment agreements" ("Regulation"), 2 " and a block exemption for
-- any agreement or category of agreements'between undertakings;
-- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
239. Article 86 provides that:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist of:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id art. 86.
240. Crane, supra note 138, at 436.
241. See BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH REP., EEC RULES OF COMPETITION 9
(1984).
242. Id.
243. Crane, supra note 138, at 439.
244. Id at 437.
245. Zwart, supra note 24, at 91-93.
246. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 5 (1985)
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specialization agreements allowing companies, whose combined share
of a substantial part of the Common Market does not exceed twenty
percent, to agree that one firm may specialize in the production of a
specific good.247
Like the block exemption, the Regulation is limited to firms
whose combined market share is under twenty percent. Within this
limitation, however, the Regulation's exemption coverage extends to
"joint R&D of products or processes with joint exploitation of the
results."2 4  This actually goes further than the comparable NCRA
because "joint exploitation" includes joint manufacturing and licenc-
ing as well as joint research ventures, 249 although it specifically
excludes joint distribution and joint sales.250 To qualify for this safe
harbor, the joint exploitation venture must comply with a clearly
defined framework and there are elements of joint venture agree-
ments, such as restricted output, prices or customers, which are abso-
lutely prohibited.251
VI. DISCUSSION
Joint ventures are presently of crucial importance to the United
States. In addition to competing with Japan and Europe in HDTV
and electronics, joint ventures are a powerful method for U.S. indus-
try to seize opportunities currently becoming available through global
de-communization.5 2 Any legislation which encourages legitimate
joint ventures and reduces the prevalent uncertainty in antitrust law
should be seriously considered. 2 3 Nevertheless, the question remains:
[hereinafter Regulation]. For a comparison of the Regulation and the NCRA, see generally
Zwart, supra note 24.
247. Regulation, supra note 246, at 1. See generally BusiNESS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
REP., supra note 241 at 34-35.
248. Zwart, supra note 24, at 92.
Under article 2, joint R&D must be carried out within the framework of a clearly
defined program. All parties must have access to the results. In the absence of
an agreement for joint exploitation, each party must be free to exploit the results
as it sees fit. When the parties do agree to joint exploitation, such exploitation
relates only to results that are protected by patents or copyrights, or constitute
know-how that "substantially contributes to technical or economic progress."
The research results must be ripe for manufacture. Moreover any jointly
appointed manufacturer must supply the R&D products to all the parties, and in




251. Id at 94.
252. See Stewart, How to Manage in the New Era, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 1990, at 68-69
(suggesting joint ventures as a way companies should manage differently in the "new era").
253. The call for greater certainty in all areas of antitrust is nothing new. See J. BuRNs,
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What antitrust reform will best promote joint ventures while main-
taining the integrity of U.S. antitrust laws? Assuming that the cur-
rent administration is adamant and correct in its position that reform
should not be limited to specific industries, such as HDTV, there are
two issues to examine: Which class of joint ventures, if any, should
benefit; and, how much benefit should be given? Thus, should Con-
gress pass legislation which would grant ETCA-type certification, or
NCRA-type registration, and in either case, should the protection
extend through distribution or stop at the production level?
Distribution joint ventures should not be given protection in
excess of current law. The risk of "spillover" effects are too great.25 4
The closer cooperative activities are to product marketing and pric-
ing, the greater the chance of impermissible collusion; additionally,
decisions on how the joint venture product will be sold and marketed
can mask signals or agreements on the pricing of other products.5 5
Bills such as the Boucher-Campbell and Edwards proposals, which
permit joint marketing, expressly invite joint pricing256 and are, there-
fore, undesirable.
On the other hand, in a pure production joint venture, each par-
ent is responsible for marketing its share of the output.257 Most
experts and commentators would agree that that alone would substan-
tially reduce antitrust concerns. Professor Kitch states that "joint
ventures are unlikely to harm competition if (1) their participants
have insufficient market share to influence competition or (2) the area
of the joint venture is removed from the current sale and marketing of
the products in which the members compete."25
Similarly, one of former-Professor Easterbrook's five "shortcuts"
to determine the validity of vertical restraints is whether the firms use
different methods of distribution. If they do, he argues, the restraints
supra note 62, at 18-50 (demonstrating confusion, conflict, and uncertainty in antitrust policy);
see also COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY FOR U.S. INDUSTRIAL
COMPETITIVENESS 80-82 (1984) (suggesting that the constant threat of private antitrust suits
limits the effectiveness of changes in public policy enforcement).
254. "A forward joint venture is formed for the joint marketing of competing finished
products .... [They] are more unusual and generally more suspect under the antitrust laws
than other types of joint ventures." PRACTICING L. INST., supra note 36, at 298-99. "An
output joint venture obligating parents to market exclusively through the joint venture raises
substantial collusive risk, for it prevents competition between the parents in marketing their
output." Brodley, supra note 25, at 1555.
255. PRACTICING L. INST., supra note 23, at 327.
256. Statement of Arthur M. Kaplan on Production Joint Ventures Before the
Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, House Committee on the Judiciary,
September 28, 1989 (on file at the University of Miami Law Review office).
257. See Pogue, supra note 24, at 931.
258. Kitch, supra note 29, at 965 (emphasis added).
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should be "deemed lawful, without further inquiry. "259 In assessing
the antitrust risk of a recent production joint venture entered into by
two horizontally related firms with large market shares (GM and
Chrysler), Professor Pitofsky stated that "[s]ince the two companies
will produce-but not sell-parts together, the joint venture will have
no impact on the marketing side [and] while the antitrust laws cover
this kind of transaction there have been virtually no challenges to pro-
duction joint ventures in 100 years. ' '2 60 A former general counsel of
the FTC said, regarding this production joint venture: "'What the
antitrust laws are worried about-a higher concentration among sell-
ers and the higher prices that result-is not going to be in effect
here.' "261
The need for this type of legislation is augmented by the current
globalized marketplace which, in terms of time and money, is a differ-
ent specie than the one that existed at the time of the Sherman Act's
passage. Where a company could formerly take from five years to a
decade to develop a technology, tool-up production facilities, and pro-
duce a product; today's high-tech environment necessitates a schedul-
ing compression such that the factory is ready upon completion of a
product's development, and a second generation product is being
developed as the first generation is shipped.262 The costs and risks of
production can be tremendous. For example, a contact printer, the
machine necessary to produce a sixteen-kilobyte computer chip, cost
less than $35,000 only fifteen years ago. Today the "steppers" which
are necessary to produce current chip technology cost $1,700,000
each and a world-class plant would need from ten to fifty of them.263
It is estimated that the cost of the next generation, a four-megabyte
chip facility, will be over a billion dollars. 264  "[W]hile 'small,
259. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANrITRUST L.J. 135,
159 (1984).
260. Browining, GM-Chrysler Pact Expected to Pass Review: Analysts Say Joint Venture
Unlikely to Be Seen as Antitrust Violation, Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1989, at DI, col. 4
(quoting Robert Pitofsky).
261. Id (quoting Michael Sohn).
262. See Kerry Bill Would Extend 1984 Legislation to HDTV Production and Marketing
Venture, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1415, at 707 (May 11, 1989). Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh states that "[b]ecause competing products, whether parallel
developments or imitations, may give an innovator no more than six months of exclusivity,
firms must develop and initiate market strategies and production scheduling with much greater
dispatch." Attorney General, Commerce Secretary Suggest Changes in Law on Joint Ventures,
56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1397, at 9 (Jan. 5, 1989).
263. Statement of J.D. Kuehler, President, IBM Corporation, Subcommittee on Economic
and Commercial Law, United States House of Representatives, Sept. 28, 1989, at 3 (on file at
the University of Miami Law Review office).
264. Id at 5.
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independent, decentralized businesses' may have 'made our country
great,' they have become victims of world markets and scale econo-
mies. To reason otherwise is to 'mold the... economy of today into
the market pattern of another era.' ",263 For these reasons, production
joint ventures should be legislatively encouraged, and for the same
reasons a Wyden-style small business bill2 6 is far too limited to have
any substantial impact.
The ETCA-style certification approach, on the other hand, is too
broad and complex. Under the Boucher-Campbell proposal,267 for
example, corporations wishing to take advantage of the protection
would have to prepare and present a highly detailed report on both
their proposals and the market condition, which is tantamount to the
preparation necessary for merger. Thus, many companies may be
deterred for administrative reasons, and others may opt to simply
take the next step and actually merge.268 While the necessary govern-
ment approval could be seen as a block to the foreign corporations'
taking advantage of production joint ventures, it could also put the
government in the unwanted position of picking domestic winners
and losers.269 Most importantly, however, the insulation which certi-
fication would provide may completely eliminate incentives for com-
petitors to seek relief in cases of actual trust violations. Even
Representative Cambpell admitted that "he sees logic in taking an
approach less extreme than his own," and that an NCRA-type proce-
dure "allowing plaintiffs to sue only for their 'actual' damages ...
265. Halverson, McCarthy & Hibner, supra note 119, at 1167 (citations omitted).
266. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
268. Frank Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy Programs in the Small Business
Administration, has testified that Congress does need to "tone down" antitrust law as a signal
to the business community that such ventures are welcome, however, he cautions that the
method should involve the "simplest procedures possible" or small businesses will not use it.
Witnesses Declare that Antitrust Law Discourages Formation of Joint Ventures, 56 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1405, at 319 (Mar. 2, 1989).
269. According to the Deputy Director for Antitrust Langenfeld and Visiting Scholar
Scheffman:
Such a certification process could involve the government picking entire
industries for antitrust exemptions. The effect of such a process presumes that
completely unrestricted joint activities will lead to more innovation, a
presumption that is not necessarily true. Moreover, such a policy could create an
active and regulatory office that selects particular industries for special
treatment. Not only would this potentially lead to a wasting of resources by
firms to obtain special privileges, it could lead to excessive investments in the
exempted industries at the expense of those industries not chosen by the office.
Langenfeld & Scheffman, Innovation and US Competition Policy, 34 ANTiTRUST BULL. 1, 61
(1989).
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might be a sufficient 'reform.' P%270
Proposals like those of Representative Fish and Senator Leahy
which adopt an NCRA extension for production joint ventures are
the most rational. Assistant Attorney General Charles Rule has said
that:
The cost, in terms of competition and government resources, is
minimal to nonexistent. And so, to my point of view, if you can
get something for nothing--and that's what the NCRA seems to
have done--we might as well get some more for nothing and
extend it to production joint ventures.
Under this approach, businesses would be able to take advantage of
the substantial certainty of registration using the same, relatively sim-
ple procedure with which they are already familiar through the
NCRA. At the same time, the availability of actual damages to pri-
vate plaintiffs would insure that private antitrust enforcement would
not be hampered. Nor would the FTC and DOJ be constrained from
investigating and prosecuting violators; as NCAA demonstrates, guilty
verdicts are certainly obtainable even under the rule of reason. 2
While such proposals have been criticized as redundant because
the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations273
already state that joint ventures are to be analyzed under the rule of
reason,2 74 it must be remembered that guidelines do not have the force
of law. Other guidelines have been seriously discounted by
lawmakers.275 Similarly, the recent trend for rule of reason analysis in
the courts should also be viewed critically, as none of the per se cases
has been expressly overruled.276 Furthermore, even if not necessary,
legislation is warranted "to the extent that industry perceives a risk of
270. Barrett, supra note 209, at B0, col. 1.
271. 60 Minutes with Rule, supra note 154, at 396-97.
272. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
273. Justice Department Releases Updated International Guide, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at 890 (Nov. 17, 1988).
274. See Azcuenaga Urges Caution over Bills to Change Laws Governing Joint Ventures, 57
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1442, at 733 (Nov. 23, 1989).
275. [A]fter the Antitrust Division issued its Vertical Restraints Guidelines, which
again seemed to question the per se rule, the House of Representatives passed a
bi-partisan resolution declaring that the... Guidelines "do not have the force of
law, do not accurately state current antitrust law, and should not be considered
by the courts of the United States as binding or persuasive."
Scher, ABA Antitrust Law Section Chair's Speech on Major Issues, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1411, at 588 (Apr. 13, 1989); see also Davidow, Hawk, Lieberknecht &
Shenefield, Questions and Answers, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1111, 1112 (1985) ("I think it's fair to
put a caveat on the record... about those Guidelines: In certain important respects, they are
the creatures of the ideology of the people who wrote them, and you see ... very narrow,
crabbed interpretations of substantive antitrust law.").
276. See note 119 and accompanying text.
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private antitrust litigation, '277 and to the extent it would focus gov-
ernment and industry on remedies, rather than on "vague and expan-




HDTV is important as a symbol of American re-emergence and
as a tangible driver of the semiconductor and electronics industries.279
Additionally, it is critical for the United States to revitalize its domes-
tic technology and manufacturing bases before there are no bases
left. 280  As Representative Markey lamented, "the Japanese and
Europeans are in the seventh inning of a tight ball game and the U.S.
is still arguing over how to get to the ball park."' 28 ' While no one
believes that antitrust reform is a panacea,2"2 in this globalized mar-
ketplace, U.S. firms are facing intense and often loosely regulated
overseas competition in industries where the stakes are large and the
windows of opportunity are small.
In such a climate, companies can ill afford to base their decisions
on speculations of what standard of review a court would use, or on
whether a jury would understand the complexities of antitrust law in
frivolous treble-damages litigation. There is a need, not for an aboli-
tion, but for a fine tuning of antitrust law to reflect the current world
situation. "Any legislation ought to reduce antitrust uncertainty and
exposure for legitimate joint ventures; it should not impair our ability
to discourage and remedy cartel behavior or other anticompetitive
arrangements; and it should operate efficiently with the least possible
277. Scher, supra note 275.
278. Id
279. See Kerry Bill Would Extend 1984 Legislation to HDTV Production and Marketing
Venture, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1415, at 707 (May 11, 1989).
280. Jack Kuehler, Vice Chairman of the Board of IBM Corp. told the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation that "[n]o one is going to make a great deal of
money in HDTV for a long time" but because Japan's development and manufacturing teams
are in place "with their heads down," the United States must provide support from both
industry and government. Id at 708.
281. HDTV Debate Continues as Subcommittee Meets, Commerce Dep't Broadens its Focus,
57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1432, at 326 (Sept. 14, 1989).
282. A study prepared by the Advanced Television Committee of the Electronic Industries
Association recommends overall policy measures, in addition to relaxing antitrust laws to
allow production joint ventures, including: reducing United States dependence on foreign
capital by cutting the deficit; increasing the savings rate; tax incentives and reforms for
investment; and federal spending for worker education and retraining programs. Study
Recommends Industry-Specific Goals to Boost Competitiveness in World Markets, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1401, at 189 (Feb. 2, 1989).
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cost and delay for the government and the parties. '2 3 Proposals such
as those of Representative Fish (H.R. 2264)284 and Senator Leahy (S.
1006),285 would accomplish these criteria.
ALVIN F. LINDSAY III
283. Rill Finds Proposals on Joint Ventures May Enhance Business Certainty, Aid US, 57
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1440, at 858 (Nov. 9, 1989).
284. See supra notes 195-97 and accompaning text.
285. See supra notes 198-201 and accompaning text.
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